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When we take people ... merely as they are,
we make them worse;
[but] when we treat them as if they were what they should be,
1
we improve them as far as they can be improved.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Thirty years ago, disabled' children were excluded from education.'
In some states, education of the handicapped was considered futile and
the exclusion of disabled children was condoned or even required.' In
l. 2 GOETHE, WILHELM MEISIBR'S APPRENTICESHIP AND TRAVELS (Thomas
Carlyle trans., 1824), reprinted in 24 THE WORKS OF THOMAS CARLYLE 111 (Edinburgh
ed., 1904).
2. The definition of disability and the relationship between impairment,
disability, and handicap has been set forth as:
Impairment is a medical term for anatomical loss or a loss of bodily function.
Disability is the measurable, functional loss resulting from an impairment.
Handicap is the social consequence caused by environmental and social
conditions which prevent a person achieving the maximum potential a person
seeks. Disabilities are what people cannot do ....
GILLIAN FULCHER, DISABLING POLICIES? A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO EDUCATION
POLICY AND DISABILITY 22 (1989) (citation omitted). The legal definition of disability
and handicap depend on the particular statute or constitutional principle asserted. The
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act defines the handicapping conditions covered
under the Act as "mental retardation, hearing impairments including deafness, speech or
language impairments, visual impairments including blindness, serious emotional
disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health
impairments, or specific learning disabilities." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (1994 & Supp.
III 1997). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 applies a functional definition
of handicap to include "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 34 C.F.R. § 104.3
(1998) (implementing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat.
355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994))). For a comparison of these
definitions, see H. RUTHERFORD TURNBULL III, FREE APPROPRIA 1E PUBLIC EDUCATION:
THE LAW AND CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 20-22 (3d ed. 1990). It is important to note,
however, that many children who qualify as educationally handicapped would not
otherwise be thought of as disabled. See Donna L. Terman et al., Special Education for
Students with Disabilities: Analysis and Recommendations, FUTURE CHILDREN, Spring
1996, at 4, 5. Children with specific learning disabilities, for example, are unlikely to be
considered disabled outside the education system. See id.
3. See generally S. REP. No. 94-168 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425;
ALLAN G. OSBORNE, JR., LEGAL ISSUES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 3-4 (1995).
4. See Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped
Act: A Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 349, 355
(1990); LaDonna L. Boeckman, Note, Bestowing the Key to Public Education: The

Effects of Judicial Determinations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act on
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other states, education of disabled children was merely a token gesture
offering little substantive educational content.' In these situations, the
placement of children in classrooms amounted to little more than
babysitting or warehousing.6
The past thirty years have substantially altered public policy toward
the disabled.' In particular, the seminal Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA)' reflects a sea of change in the public obligation
to specially educate the disabled by investing affirmatively in their
mental and physical development.' But are disabled children receiving
the fruits of that intended investment? Are they receiving more than
babysitting? Are they receiving valuable education? Many would argue
that they are not. 10
Disabled and Nondisabled Students, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 855, 860-61 (1998). As late as
1965, a North Carolina statute made it a crime for parents to insist on public education
for their disabled children after the State had found them uneducable. See Daniel H.
Melvin II, Comment, The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities, 44 DEPAUL L.
REV. 599,604 (1995).
5. See Rebecca Weber Goldman, Comment, A Free Appropriate Education in the
Least Restrictive Environment: Promises Made, Promises Broken by the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U. DAYTON L. REv. 243, 246-47 (1994).
6. See id. Mildly impaired students were placed in regular classrooms if they
could "survive" without specialized services, moderately disabled students were given
"custodial" care in segregated settings by uncertified staff, and severely disabled children
were institutionalized. Id.

7. See generally TURNBULL, supra note 2.
8. IDEA is the current title for statutory enactments under 20 U.S.C. § 1400.
Alternatively referred to in the case law and the literature by predecessor titles the
"Education of the Handicapped Act" (EHA) and the "Education for All Handicapped
Children Act" (EAHCA), this Comment uses IDEA as the general descriptor for the
provisions of 20 U.S.C. § 1400. EAHCA specifically refers to the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, which significantly
amended the Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175
(1970). IDEA 97 distinguishes the most recent amendments enacted by the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37.
For additional legislative history, see discussion infra Parts II.B, ILD.
9. See discussion infra Part ILB-D. For general background and history of the
IDEA, see H. C. HUDGINS, JR. & RICHARD s. VACCA, LAW AND EDUCATION:
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND COURT DECISIONS § 13 (4th ed. 1995); TuRNBULL, supra
note 2.
10. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 5, at 245 (arguing that the promise of
educational rights for handicapped children remains unfulfilled); Robert Caperton
Hannon, Note, Returning to the True Goal of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act: Self-Sufficiency, 50 VAND. L. REV. 715 passim (1997) (describing societal lack of
commitment to provide funding and services under the IDEA); Tara L. Eyer,
Commentary, Greater Expectations: How the 1997 IDEA Amendments Raise the Basic
Floor of Opportunity for Children with Disabilities, 126 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 1 (1998)
(noting that today many children receive little more than a seat in a public school
classroom). A scathing report released recently by the National Council on Disability
charges that "[m]any children with disabilities are getting substandard schooling because
states are not complying with federal rules on special education." Karen Gullo, Study:
States Ignore Special Ed Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 24, 2000, available in 2000 WL
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These are the same questions our country is asking for non-disabled
11
children. Parents, educators, and child advocates are demanding that
children receive more than a seat in a classroom for twelve years. They
are demanding high-quality education that focuses on positive outcomes,
12
high standards, and accountability.
Both special education and general education reforms can be traced, in
part, to litigation asserting substantive rights to Equal Protection and a
1
measurable quantum of education. ' Unlike general education reforms,
however, which have met unsuccessful federal lawsuits with successful
state constitutional challenges, special education reforms have followed
14
a primarily legislative path. The judicial path of general education has
yielded a substantive right to adequate education in more than a dozen
1
states. ' In contrast, the legislative path has provided little more than
inefficient and often obtuse procedural remedies for an ill-defined and
1
frequently disputed statutory entitlement to special education. ' Without
the substantive right to a measurable quantity of education, schools may
go through the motions of instruction, but far too often, children with
special needs do not learn.
This Comment argues that the demands for general education efficacy
apply a fortiori to disabled children. This Comment further contends
that while special education law based on federal statute may be
insufficient to support such accountability, the California Constitution
11
provides a legal basis without further statutory enactments. The basis
9750358. For the full text of the report submitted to Congress and President Clinton, see
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BACK TO SCHOOL ON CIVIL RIGHTS: ADVANCING THE
FEDERAL COMMITMENT TO LEAVE No CHILD BEHIND, Jan. 25, 2000, available at National
Council on Disability, Publications (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.ncd.gov/
publications/backtoschool_l .html> [hereinafter BACK TO SCHOOL].
11. See Kristin Geenen et al., A Disability Perspective on Five Years of Education
Reform, SYNTHESIS REP. 22 (Nat'! Ctr. on Educ. Outcomes, Univ. of Minn.,
Minneapolis, Minn.), Dec. 1995, at 1-5, microformed on ERIC, Fiche ED 396 476 (ERIC
Document Reprod. Serv., Computer Microfilm Int'! Corp.). A significant impetus for
outcome-based education reform was the 1983 report from the National Commission on
Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Education Reform, which
described the poor performance of U.S. students relative to their past achievement and
student outcomes in other counties. See Geenen, supra, at 3.
12. See Geenen, supra note 11, at 1-5.
13. See discussion infra Parts ILA, Ill.A.
14. See id.
15. See discussion infra Part III.C.
16. See discussion infra Part IL
17. This Comment does not suggest that a detailed state statutory scheme is
inappropriate given the traditional hesitation of courts to fashion regulatory, monitoring,
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is found in adequacy" assurances of article IX, section 1 of the
California Constitution: the Education Clause."
Part II of this Comment provides a brief history of special education in
the United States, from early demands for equal access to the current
emphasis on outcomes. Part III examines general education reform from
equality to adequacy, and suggests that its lessons be applied to special
education reform as well. Part IV draws upon California precedent and
constitutional challenges brought in state courts across the country in
asking whether the California Constitution requires adequacy in
education. Part V identifies essential elements of adequate education
and evaluates California's programs against that test. Finally, Part VI
suggests legal and policy strategies to improve the quality of special
education in California schools.
II. THE HISTORY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION REFORM
IN THE UNITED STATES

In the wake of civil rights successes of the 1960s and sparked by
Equal Protection promises of Brown v. Board of Education,'0 parents of
handicapped children began to demand access to education during the
21
1970s. The initial forum for these demands was the courts. In 1972,
two pivotal cases led the way: Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
22
Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania and Mills v. Board of Education."
A. Early Case Law in Special Education

In PARC,

parents of mentally retarded

students challenged

or enforcement schemes without legislative guidance. Indeed, given the pretrial
impediments to court-supervised monitoring involving the varied population and
complex issues here implied, a detailed statutory scheme may be well-advised. Such a
system is not precluded by federal law, because no federal law "occupies the field."
However, as argued below, accountability is constitutionally grounded and may be
demanded even absent a best case approach.
18. Adequate is defined as: "Sufficient; commensurate; equally efficient; equal to
what is required; suitable to the case or occasion; satisfactory. Equal to some given
occasion or work." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 39 (6th ed. 1990). Adequacy is used as a
term of art applied to analysis of state constitution education clauses. See discussion
infra Part 111.C-D. Thus, adequacy is a quality standard defining the minimum quantum
of education that a state must constitutionally provide to its children.
19. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § I ("A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence
being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the
Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific,
moral, and agricultural improvement.").
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see discussion infra Part III.
21. See HUDGINS & VACCA, supra note 9, at 456; Goldman, supra note 5, at 246.
22. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
23. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
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Pennsylvania statutes that excluded them from public education. 24
PARC alleged that these statutes violated Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection and Due Process guarantees." The federal district court
agreed, noting expert testimony that stated "[a]ll mentally retarded
persons are capable of benefitting from a program of education and
training." 26
The consent decree that settled PARC established
Pennsylvania's obligation to educate mentally retarded children," while
an accompanying stipulation detailed procedural safeguards protecting
the right to education for all students."
Similar Due Process and Equal Protection violations were asserted in
24. See PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 281-82. Section 13-1375 of the Pennsylvania law
provided for the establishment of standards to certify children as "uneducable and
untrainable" and relieved the State Board of Education from educating or training such
children. Id. at 282 & n.3. Children could also be denied education based on section 131304 of the law, which excluded children who had not reached a mental age of five
(effectively excluding children with an LQ. of 35 or below). See id. at 282 & n.4. A
determination that a child was unable to profit from school attendance also justified
denying education. See id. at 282 & nn.5-6.
25. See id. at 283. PARC alleged that retarded students were arbitrarily denied
education given to other children and labeled "uneducable" without a rational basis in
fact, thus violating Equal Protection. Id. PARC also contended that because the Unite,l
States Constitution and the laws of Pennsylvania guaranteed education to all children,
the statutes in question violated substantive Due Process by arbitrarily and capriciously
denying education to retarded children. This contention also raised the question of
whether the state law of Pennsylvania afforded children an affirmative right to education.
Finally, PARC argued that the Pennsylvania statutes offended procedural Due Process
because the statutes lacked any provision for notice or hearing before excluding mentally
retarded students from the public school system. See id.
26. Id. at 296. Because this case was settled by the parties, the court was not asked
to decide the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. See id. at 290. The defendants agreed to
settle only after the plaintiffs had presented expert testimony indicating that all mentally
retarded children could benefit from education. See id. at 285, 296. However, of the
nearly 600 defendants, a single defendant school district refused to accept the negotiated
settlement and challenged the jurisdiction of the court over the parties and the subject
matter of the controversy. See id. at 289-90. In deciding the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction, the court reviewed the record independently in order to satisfy itself that the
plaintiffs' claims were not "wholly insubstantial and frivolous." Id. at 293 (quoting Bell
v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)). The court was convinced that PARC had
established a colorable procedural Due Process claim and had raised "serious doubts ...
as to the existence of a rational basis" for the alleged Equal Protection violations. Id. at
297. The court described the settlement as an "intelligent response to overwhelming
evidence against" the defendants' case. Id. at 291.
27. See id. at306-16.
28. See id. at 303-05. The stipulation gave parents of mentally retarded children
an active role in their education, including the right to notice of any proposed changes in
educational status; the right to inspect their child's educational records; and an
opportunity for a due process hearing in which parents could present evidence, be
represented by counsel, and for which they could receive a transcript. See id.
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Mills by a plaintiff class comprised of children with behavioral and
emotional problems, as well as mental retardation. 29 The defendant
school district did not dispute its affirmative duty to provide public
education or constitutionally adequate Due Process, admitting failure to
discharge both obligations.'0 The school district asserted that it was
unable to provide the required educational services given available
funds, for to do so would be "inequitable" to other children in the school
district.' 1 However, the Mills court rejected these claims, stating that the
financial inadequacies of the district "cannot be permitted to bear more
heavily on the 'exceptional' or handicapped child than on the normal
child."" The court ruled that "available funds must be expended
equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a
publicly supported education. " 33
Taken together, these cases defined the contours of education for
handicapped children for the next quarter century. Three basic
principles established in PARC and Mills formed the essential
foundation for subsequent litigation and legislative reforms.34 First,
Equal Protection and substantive Due Process prevent states that choose
to provide public education from excluding children solely on the basis
of disability." Second, parents of the disabled are entitled to procedural
29. See id. This case involved disabled children in the District of Columbia. See
id. As such, their education was covered by section 31-201 of the District of Columbia
Code, requiring mandatory school attendance, and by D.C. Board of Education rules,
requiring attendance in specialized education classes for students who could benefit from
such education. See id. at 873-74. The court interpreted these provisions to impose an
affirmative duty upon the D.C. Board of Education for educating all D.C. children,
including those with exceptional needs. See id. at 874. The Mills court fashioned its
constitutional analysis of the case after similar education cases involving District of
Columbia students. See id. at 874-75. In Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C.
1967), Judge Skelly Wright had held that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
implicated an Equal Protection guarantee of the right to equal educational opportunity by
analogy to the Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation of First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendment rights. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875 (citing Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 493).
The Mills court extended the right of equal opportunity for publicly supported education
to disabled children. See id. The court also held that procedural elements of Fifth
Amendment Due Process required a hearing prior to exclusion, termination, or special
education classification of exceptional D.C. students. See id.
30. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 871.
3 I. Id. at 875.
32. Id. at 876.
33. Id.
34. See generally HUDGINS & VACCA, supra note 9; TURNBULL, supra note 2;
Weber, supra note 4.
35. The early cases did not explicitly prohibit states from excluding children from
education upon an unequivocal determination that they could not, in any way, benefit
from its provision. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 866-83; Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 279-316 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Research
showing that all children could benefit from some form of education or training,
however, effectively closed the door on such exclusion. See PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 285,
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Due Process in order to assert their children's right to receive public
education. 36 Third, the additional costs of providing appropriate
educational services to disabled students cannot be used to justify
categorical exclusion of disabled children from public school. 37 The
gates to the schoolhouse had been opened for handicapped children.
B. Congressional Actions to Advance Education
of Disabled Children

Beginning in 1958, Congress expressed support for the education of
handicapped children through various grant programs." In 1970,
Congress replaced and expanded existing programs by enacting the
Education of the Handicapped Act."
Subsequent amendments
conditioned federal assistance on state assurances of educational
opportunity for all handicag,Ped children, and due process protections
should services be denied.
By 1975, however, less than half the
estimated eight million handicapped children in the United States were
receiving appropriate education while 1.75 million were not receiving
296. This principle has become known as the "zero reject" policy. See TURNBULL,
supra note 2, at 27-79.
36. Procedural Due Process was initially envisioned as a check on the State's
ability to exclude disabled students from education or to label them as special needs, but
has evolved to encompass parental rights to challenge an array of school district
decisions regarding their children's education. See generally TURNBULL, supra note 2, at
192-211.
37. Under the "zero reject" policy, all children must be served by state-supported
education. See id. at 27-79, 172-79. Subsequent development of special education law
has permitted the consideration of cost in determining the level of services provided to an
individual student. See id. at 172-79. Most recently, however, the U.S. Supreme Court
reiterated its interpretation of the IDEA as requiring the provision of services necessary
for a child to attend school without consideration of the cost or magnitude of those
services. See Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 119 S. Ct. 992 (1999);
see also infra note 138 (providing details of this case in greater depth). In order to be
able to attend school, Garret requires extensive support in the form of health-related
services that can be performed by a non-physician caregiver. See id.
38. See, e.g., National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72
Stat. 1580; Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-11, 79
Stat. 27 (amended 1966, 1967). General civil rights protections were also provided by
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibited discrimination on the
basis of disability in all programs receiving federal funds. See Rehabilitation Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1994)).
39. Pub. L. No. 91-230, §§ 601-662 [TilLE VI], 84 Stat. 121, 175-88 (1970).
40. See Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, §§ 611-621 [Part B Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974], 88 Stat. 484, 579-87.
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any educational services at all. 41
A 1975 report of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee
acknowledged the rights of handicapped children to appropriate
education which, by that time, had been repeated in more than thirty-six
state and federal court decisions." Lack of financial resources, the
Committee concluded, prevented states from implementing the law. 43
The report stressed the need for legislation to address this issue, on
economic as well as constitutional grounds, asserting that proper
education would permit the handicapped to "become productive citizens,
contributing to society instead of being forced to remain burdens.'.w
Accordingly, Congress concluded that it was in the "national interest
that the Federal Government assist [s]tate and local efforts to provide
programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped children in order
to assure equal protection of the law."45 With this patina of intent,
Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
(EAHCA) in 1975 for the purpose of ensuring that
all handicapped children have available ... a free appropriate public education
which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their
unique needs, to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents
or guardians are protected, to assist [s]tates and localities to provide for the
education of all handicapped children, and to assess and assure the effectiveness
of efforts to educate handicapped children. 46

Although case law and other federal statutes arguably imposed
substantially similar requirements on states," the EAHCA provided
41. See S. REP. No. 94-168, at 8 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1432.
42. See id. at 7, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1431.
43. See id. at 7-8, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1431-32.
44. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1433.
45. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, sec.
3(a), § 60l(b)(9), 89 Stat. 773, 775.
46. Id. § 601(c).
47. See TURNBULL, supra note 2, at 18-22. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 prohibits federally-funded programs from discriminating on the basis of
handicap. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355,394
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)). Section 504 is broader in scope than
the EAHCA (IDEA), which prescribes that only specific handicapping conditions are
eligible for assistance. Cf 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). But section
504's requirement for reasonable accommodation of disabled students has frequently
been ignored and is often misinterpreted by courts and school districts. See Goldman,
supra note 5, at 249. See generally Kristine L. Lingren, Comment, The Demise of
Reasonable Accommodation Under Section 504: Special Education, the Public Schools,
and an Unfunded Mandate, 1996 WISC. L. REv. 633 (discussing the uncertainty in
interpreting section 504 and its implementing regulations promulgated by the U.S.
Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights). Lingren suggests that section 504
may hold a higher standard for educating children than that under IDEA. See id. at 636.
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) now provides protections
similar to section 504. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994). It has infrequently been invoked
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incentives in the form of grants rather than a federal mandate to follow
its provisions. States would be entitled to receive federal funds upon a
showing of compliance, but were not precluded by federal law from
eschewing such support and meeting a lesser standard."
The chief tenet of the EAHCA (and its successor, the IDEA) is the
provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for all children
in the least restrictive environment (LRE). 49 The mechanism for
providing an afpropriate education is the individualized education
5
program (IEP).
The IBP details educational and related services
designed by a team of local educators, service providers, and the child's
parents, to meet the unique needs of that particular child." LRE is a
term of art" providing that handicapped children should be educated
with children who are not handicapped "[t]o the maximum extent
appropriate" and should be segregated "only when the nature or severity
of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with
the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
53
satisfactorily. "
These seemingly straightforward provisions have become the basis for
significant controversy since the EAHCA was first enacted. 54 As
detailed below, the questions of what defines an appropriate education
in education litigation. See William D. Goren, Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act: The Interrelationship to the ADA and Preventive Law, FLA. B.J., July-Aug. 1997, at
76, 78; see also Michael L. Williams, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, OCR Senior
Staff Memorandum, U.S. Dept. of Educ., Office for Civil Rights (Nov. 19, 1992),
reprinted in 19 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES Eouc. L. REP. 859 (providing guidance
on issues of coverage and comparing application of Title II of the ADA and section 504).
48. See, e.g., New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. State, 495 F. Supp. 391,
394 (D.N.M. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 678 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1982). In order to
avoid the requirements of the EAHCA, New Mexico did not apply for federal EAHCA
funds until 1989. See Peter Cubra, Discrimination of People with Disabilities and Their
Federal Rights-Still Waiting After All These Years, 22 N.M. L. REv. 277, 287 & n.57
(1992).
49. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Weber, supra note 4, at 36064.
50. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
51. See id.; see also TuRNBULL, supra note 2, at 121-24 (describing the
components and rationale for the IEP).
52. See Sara V. Winter, Children with Disabilities: The Right to Be Educated in
the Least Restrictive Environment, NEV. LAW., May 1998, at 16, 16.
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
54. Special education litigation has steadily increased in the past 20 years with the
number of published decisions approaching 50 per year. See Perry A. Zirkel, Tuition
Reimbursement for Special Education Students, FUTURE CHILDREN, Winter 1997, at 122,
123.
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and least restnctlve environment remain central issues in special
education policy and law.
Another kel element of the EAHCA was a high level of parental
involvement.' Parents would share in decisions regarding the placement
of their children, the development of IEP goals, and the services to be
provided to achieve these goals." To ensure parental involvement and
protect the rights established for handicapped children, the EAHCA
incorporated procedural safeguards modeled after the stipulation in
PARC." If parents disagreed with the local education agency, these
safeguards provided a variety of mechanisms for resolving the conflict,
including informal negotiations, administrative hearings, and ultimately
civil action in federal or state courts.''
In reality, however, special education due process" has become a
complicated, burdensome, and expensive endeavor of which both
parents and local school districts complain. School districts complain of
the cost in both time and money, which could be better spent on
providing educational services.'° Parents, although envisioned as
partners in a non-adversarial process, are frequently intimidated by the
educational bureaucracy into acquiescence with school district
recommendations, which all too often, are motivated by fiscal and

55. See S. REP. No. 94-168, at 10-12 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1434-36; Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-142, sec. 5, § 614(l)(C)(iii), 89 Stat. 773, 785; Goldman, supra note 5, at 251.
56. See S. REP. No. 94-168, at 10-12; Education for All Handicapped Children Act
sec. 5, § 614(l)(C)(iii); Goldman, supra note 5, at 251.
57. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act sec. 5, § 615; Goldman,
supra note 5, at 253, 280-82. See generally Antonis Katsiyannis & John W. Maag,

Ensuring Appropriate Education: Emerging Remedies, Litigation, Compensation, and
Other Legal Considerations, 63 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 451 (1997) (discussing
traditional remedies courts have awarded under the IDEA (EAHCA) and an increasing
trend for courts to award compensatory education to students denied FAPE).
58. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act sec. 5, § 615; Philip T.K.
Daniel & Karen Bond Coriell, Traversing the Sisyphean Trails of the Education for All
Handicapped Children's Act: An Overview, 18 Omo N.U. L. REv. 571, 593-97 (1992);
Sara V. Winter, Administrative Proceedings for Enforcing the Rights of Students in
Special Education, NEV. LAW., Oct. 1997, at 26, 26-27 (providing a concise outline of
current due process options); Goldman, supra note 5, at 280. See generally TURNBULL,
supra note 2, at I 96-211.
59. In the context of special education, due process is frequently used as a term of
art, referring specifically to the detailed administrative procedures for asserting a child's
right to special education and for disputing local education agency decisions regarding
its provision. See generally COMMUNITY ALLIANCE FOR SPECIAL EDUC. & PR01ECTION
AND ADVOCACY, SPECIAL EDUCATION RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (7th ed. 1998).
60. See H. REP. No. 105-95, at 85 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 82;
TURNBULL, supra note 2, at 210-1 l; Peter J. Kuriloff & Steven S. Goldberg, ls Mediation
a Fair Way to Resolve Special Education Disputes? First Empirical Findings, 2 HARV.
NEGOTIATION L. REV. 35, 40-41 (1997).
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political incentives rather than the true needs of the child.61 When a
dispute does arise, only the most sophisticated and affluent are able to
mount a successful challenge, and it may take years to reach a judicially
enforceable decision.62 Those who succeed in due process may secure
educational opportunities for their children entirely unavailable to
most. 63 But even for these fortunate children, the cost in time spent
disputing an educational program may be time irretrievably lost.64 Thus,
the system designed to eliminate inequities in education may actually
create a two-class system of discrimination based on the assertiveness
and resources of the parents.
Another significant goal of the EAHCA was to assess and assure the
effectiveness of education for handicapped children. 65
Congress
assumed that by specifying procedures for providing education and the
61. See Goldman, supra note 5, at 263-65, 277-82. The parity position for parents
is illusory; parents who challenge the school are criticized for not trusting professionals
and may simply defer to their recommendations. See id. at 280. Court adjudications are
rare despite school districts' inappropriate financial incentives regarding evaluation and
placement, such as biased funding formulas, classroom space, and staff availability. See
id. at 263-65; see also Theresa M. Willard, Note, Economics and the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act: The Influence of Funding Formulas on the Identification and
Placement of Disabled Students, 31 IND. L. REv. 1167, 1181-84 (1998) (discussing ways
that inappropriate funding incentives can lead to disputed educational placement
recommendations). These types of problems have also been described in terms of
"information costs" for the disabled. Scott A. Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Note, Public
Funding for Disability Accommodations: A Rational Solution to Rational Discrimination
and the Disabilities of the ADA, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 214 (1998). The
disabled can only take action against mistreatment they are aware of. See id.
Furthermore, anti-discrimination policy can be furthered only to the extent that
discrimination is uncovered and remediated-and these results deter future
discrimination. See id. at 209.
62. See Goldman, supra note 5, at 279-82 (describing the hurdles of information,
time, and money for parents in due process). The median time between filing a civil suit
and convening court adjudication in special education cases has risen to almost three and
a half years. See Robert L. Morgan et al., Use of Mediation and Negotiation in the
Resolution of Special Education Disputes, 116 EDUC. 287, 287 (1995).
63. According to one special education administrator, "A few people are making a
lot of noise and getting attorneys and getting a high degree of service .... [But] [o)ther
people are getting a lower level of service." John Gittelsohn & Susan Kelleher, O.C.
Special-Ed System at Precipice, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Dec. 23, 1998, at Al, available
in 1998 WL 21286323 (indicating that I% of special education students in Orange
County are in private placements at an average cost of $21,000 per year, but also
suggesting that costs in excess of$ I 00,000 per student per year have been incurred).
64. See Willard, supra note 61, at I 187; see also Goldman, supra note 5, at 281-82
(noting that it is of little value to a child if the court finding that he received
inappropriate first grade education does not come until he is in fourth grade).
65. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142,
sec. 3(a), § 60l(c), 89 Stat 773, 775.
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process by which its objectives would be implemented, the substantive
content of that education would be assured.,,. Until 1997, however,
issues of educational quality and positive outcomes for students with
disabilities had not been directly addressed by the Act.6' This Comment
asserts that Congress's inattention to these issues and its assumption that
states would detail the requisite substantive components of educating
disabled students, if given financial assistance, has resulted in great
disappointment and confusion in special education. Describing only the
manner in which education is to be provided has not guaranteed that its
content is of high quality. Providing only the mechanism for students to
enter the gates of the schoolhouse has proven a hollow victory for
millions of disabled students who are not ensured meaningful education
before leaving.
The EAHCA, however, is not static. Within the limits of their
authority, Congress continues to improve upon and refine the EAHCA
through amendment and reauthorization. 68 In 1986, assistance for the
develor,ment of early intervention services for infants and toddlers was
added.' The 1986 amendments also authorized attorneys' fees for
parents who prevail in due process proceedings and judicial actions
70
against school districts. In 1990, the act was renamed the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)." The most sweeping changes,
however, were recently brought about by the 1997 amendments for the
reauthorization of the IDEA, 72 as discussed below in Part II.D.
C.

Judicial Interpretation

Since its enactment, courts have been called upon to interpret the full
66. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). In reviewing the
legislative history of the EAHCA, the Supreme Court concluded:
We think that the congressional emphasis upon full participation of concerned
parties throughout the development of the IEP, as well as the requirements that
state and local plans be submitted to the Secretary for approval, demonstrates
the legislative conviction that adequate compliance with the procedures
prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished
in the way of substantive content in an IEP.
67. See discussion infra Part ILD.
68. See H. REP. No. 105-95, at 82, 83 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78,
80 (reviewing the legislative history of the IDEA).
69. See Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-457, 100 Stat. 1145.
70. See Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100
Stat. 796.
71. See Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-476, 104 Stat 1103.
72. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (Supp. III 1997)).
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range of the EAHCA and IDEA provisions. However, two particularly
relevant aspects of the statute have become the focus of significant
judicial scrutiny: FAPE and LRE.
1.

Free Appropriate Public Education

In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to interpret "appropriate"
education under the Act." Amy Rowley, an intelligent deaf child,
claimed that she had been denied an appropriate education because the
Hendrick Hudson Central School District refused to provide a signlanguage interpreter in her first grade classes." Because Amy had been
performing well in the regular education environment with the additional
supports of speech therapy, tutoring, and a hearing aid, the school
district determined that she did not need an interpreter." However, she
was "not learning as much, or performing as well academically, as she
76
would without her handicap." Her parents asserted that sign-language
interpretation would permit her to understand more of what was said in
the classroom and thereby achieve more of her potential." The district
court agreed, holding that an appropriate education must provide each
child "an opportunity to achieve his full potential commensurate with
the opportunity provided to other children."" The United States Court
73. Board of Educ. v. Rowley. 458 U.S. 176, 186 (1982). Rowley was the first
case to come before the U.S. Supreme Court under the EAHCA. See id. at 187.
74. See id. at 184-85.
75. See id. A sign-language interpreter had been provided for a trial period in
kindergarten, but he concluded that Amy did not need his services at that time. See id.
The school district had also consulted experts, Amy's teacher, and visited a class for the
deaf before reaching its decision. See id.
76. Id. at 185 (quoting Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 532
(S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
77. See id. at 184-85.
78. Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 534. It should be noted that the district court did not
attempt to establish a higher standard for educating handicapped students than for nonhandicapped students. The court was careful lo point out that "even the best public
schools lack the resources to enable every child to achieve his full potential." Id. The
qualification that a child's potential should be maximized "commensurate with the
opportunity provided other children," was intended to impose a similar standard of
education for both the handicapped and the non-handicapped. Id. at 534. The court
suggested that an "appropriate" education standard should compare Amy Rowley's
"performance to that of non-handicapped students of similar intellectual calibre and
comparable energy and initiative" in determining the level of services that should be
provided. Id. Under this standard, a handicapped child would be given the opportunity
to achieve as much of his or her potential as a non-handicapped child in the same
environment.
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of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 79
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, ruled that since Amy had been
making satisfactory progress and had been provided personalized
instruction and related services as required by the EAHCA, Amy's
education was appropriate.'0 In reaching this decision, the Court adopted
a two-part inquiry." First, had the state complied with the procedures of
the EAHCA?" Second, is the student's individualized educational
program "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits?"" If these requirements were met, then the state
had met its obligation under the EAHCA and the Court would require no
more."
The Rowley Court rejected interpretations of appropriate education
imposing both greater and lesser duties on states receiving EAHCA
funds." In looking to legislative history, the Court concluded that the
primary intent of Congress was "to open the door of public education to
handicapped children" rather than "guarantee any particular level of
education once inside."86 Nevertheless, Congress had not intended to
spend millions of dollars without the expectation of "some educational
benefit" for handicapped children."
Mere access to the same
educational services provided non-handicapped children would probably
fall short of the EAHCA's requirements." Yet providing every special
service necessary for a handicapped child to reach his or her maximum
potential wa~ more than Congre~s had intended."
Similarly, states were not required to provide objectively equal
opportunities to learn because such a standard would prove "entirel~
unworkable ... requiring impossible measurements and comparisons."
The Court construed the EAHCA to give deference to states in
determining the substantive content of education, noting that "courts
must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational
methods."" Instead, compliance with extensive procedural requirements
79. See Rowley v. Board of Educ., 632 F.2d 945, 945 (2d Cir. 1980).
80. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.
81. See id. at 206-07.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 207.
84. See id. at 206-07.
85. See id. at 192-200.
86. Id. at 192.
87. See id. at 200-01. "Some educational benefit," or more simply, "some
benefit," has become a term of art used to describe the standard espoused by the Rowley
Court.
88. See id. at 198-99.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 198.
9 I. Id. at 207 ('The primary responsibility for formulating the education ... and
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was emphasized as the means Congress had intended to assure much, if
not all, in the way of substantive educational content."
The Rowley decision has been widely criticized as a setback for
handicapped students." Scholars who had read great promise of
bountiful rewards into the EAHCA were left with only the minimal
expectation of "some benefit."94 Despite admonitions by the Court that
Rowley should be read narrowly," it was feared that the decision would
permit states to receive EAHCA funds yet provide only de minimis
•
96
services.
Indeed, many courts have relied on Rowley to deny services," such as
98
placements in private school rather than public school.
In denying
for choosing the educational method ... was left by the Act to state and local educational
agencies in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child.").
92. See id. at 206.
93. See, e.g., Weber, supra note 4, at 351, 364-66, 374-77 (describing expectations
for the EAHCA prior to Rowley and reaction to the decision); Boeckman, supra note 4,
at 868 (noting high hopes for the EAHCA).
94. See Weber, supra note 4, at 374 ("The Act's promise of lavish services for
handicapped children was now a grudgingly borne obligation to do the minimum
necessary.").
95. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202. Justice Rehnquist cautioned:
We do not attempt today to establish any one test for determining the adequacy
of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act.
Because in this case we are presented with a handicapped child who is
receiving substantial specialized instruction and related services, and who is
performing above average in the regular classrooms of a public school system,
we confine our analysis to that situation.
Id.
96. See Weber, supra note 4, at 374-76; Eyer, supra note 10, at 8.
97. See Weber, supra note 4, at 377; Eyer, supra note 10, at 8.
98. See, e.g., Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 611-14 (8th Cir.
1997) (holding proposed public education, described by state level review officer as "'hit
and miss' and as not having produced a demonstrable plan of progress," was appropriate
because the IEP outlined the student's particular needs, responded to them in compliance
with IDEA, and no state educational authority had criticized the teaching method); Lenn
v. Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1085 (1st Cir. 1993) (affirming that school
district's IEP was "reasonably calculated to be of significant educational benefit" despite
evidence that the child's progress in public school had "slowed to a crawl"); G.D. v.
Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 942, 948 (]st Cir. 1991) (following Rowley and
stating that "FAPE may not be the only appropriate choice, or the choice of certain
selected experts, or the child's parents' first choice, or even the best choice .... FAPE
is simply one which fulfills the minimum federal statutory requirements") (emphasis
added); see also Martin W. Bates, Free Appropriate Public Education Under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Requirements, Issues and Suggestions, 1994
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 215, 220 (lamenting that the vague language of Rowley can be read
by educational agencies as a relief from duty); Weber, supra note 4, at 377 n. 166
(providing an extensive list of pre-1990 cases denying private placements and other
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private school placement to a neurologically impaired child, for
example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that private
school was likely superior to the public school placement proposed in
99
the IEP.
The court likened public placement to "a serviceable
Chevrolet" while private school was the equivalent of "a Cadillac."' 00
Relying on Rowley, the court held that the state was "not required to
provide a Cadillac, and that the proposed IEP [was] reasonably
calculated to provide educational benefits," thus satisfying the
requirements for appropriate education.'°'
Recent attempts to require schools to demonstrate that a child has
actually benefitted from his or her education have been largely
102
unsuccessful.
Courts have interpreted the FAPE requirement as
prospective, requiring that school districts devise educational plans
calculated to provide some benefit rather than provide education that
103
actually benefits the child in a meaningful way.
In E.S. v. Independent School District,"" for example, the plaintiff, a
dyslexic child entering seventh grade, claimed that the school district
had provided inadequate education because she was reading at only a 3.8
grade-level.' 0' During the three previous years of special education, her
reading had progressed only 0.8 grade-level equivalents.' 06 The school
district agreed to provide one-to-one tutoring in the Orton-Gillingham
instruction method during summer school. 10' The plaintiff's mother
requested continuation of this service because E.S. was making progress,
but the school district refused. 108 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed lower court and administrative rulings that E.S. had failed to
prove that one-to-one instruction was necessary for her to benefit from
her education, despite her showing of a lack of progress before
services under Rowley); Eyer, supra note 10, at 8 & n.77 (observing that under Rowley,
courts "have rarely held an IEP to be insufficient when the school complied with proper
procedures" and listing case examples).
99. See Doe v. Board. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459 (6th Cir. 1993). The student was
unable to engage in normal language and thinking skills due to an impairment of
auditory information processing. See id. at 456.
100. Id. at 459.
101. Id. at 460.
102. See Judith Gran, Major Circuit Court Decisions in 1998, Address at The
Second Annual Conference of The Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates (Jan. 30,
1999) (audiotape available from COPAA, P.O. Box 81-7327, Hollywood, FL 33084).
103. See id.
104. 135 F.3d 566 (8th Cir. 1998).
105. See id. at 567-68.
106. See id. at 567. Similar deficiencies were found in her written language and
writing skills. See id.
107. See id. at 568. Orton-Gillingham is a multi-sensory approach used to instruct
learning disabled students in reading. See id. at 568 n.4.
108. See id. at 568.
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beginning the Orton-Gillingham program.'"'
Cases such as E.S. represent a significant departure from Rowley.
Amy Rowley was making satisfactory progress, advancing easily from
grade to grade even though she might have achieved greater academic
success with additional supports." 0 In contrast, E.S. had made less than
one year of reading progress during three years of special education,
which the court found sufficient to fulfill the requirements of the IDEA
under Rowley."' However, the Rowley Court had expressly limited its
decision to the facts of that case specifically because Amy Rowley was
performing above the average."' Thus, despite the Supreme Court's
statement that they were not attempting "to establish any one test for
determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all
children covered by the Act," 113 lower courts appear to be interpreting
Rowley as though its test for appropriateness applies in all cases.
In a small number of cases, however, courts have departed from the
general trend by applying Rowley narrowly. 114 Such courts have either
interpreted Rowley to require additional services because the disputed
IEP offered no benefit or have distinguished the facts of a case to avoid
. Rowley. "'
app1ymg
A broad interpretation of Rowley has proven especially difficult in
cases involving the severely handicapped. Polk v. Central Susquehanna
Intermediate Unit 16,"' for example, concerned a fourteen-year-old with
the mental capacity of a toddler.'" Contrasting the meaning of "some
109. See id. at 568-69.
110. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 185 (1982).
111. See E.S., 135 F.3d at 567.
112. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202.
113. Id.
114. See Eyer, supra note 10, at 8-10; see also Weber, supra note 4, at 377-404
(describing lower court decisions that retreat from Rowley and the basis for such
decisions).
115. See, e.g., County of San Diego v. California Special Educ. Hearing Office, 93
F.3d 1458, 1459 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding residential placement appropriate for an
emotionally disturbed teen because alternative day treatment program failed to
implement major IEP goals and produced no real progress); Polk v. Central Susquehanna
Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that Rowley is a narrow
decision); Hall v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 630-36 (4th Cir. 1985)
(recognizing promotions from grade-to-grade as a fallible measure of educational benefit
in the case of a functionally illiterate, 16-year-old dyslexic child); Weber, supra note 4,
at 377-404; Eyer, supra note 10, at 8-10.
116. 853 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1988).
117. See id. at 173. Christopher Polk contracted encephalopathy at the age of seven
months, which left him mentally retarded and severely developmentally delayed. See id.
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benefit" in the context of educational progress made by Amy Rowley
with that of Christopher Polk, 11 ' the court held that the Rowley standard
required more than mere de minimis benefit. 119 Due to the severity of
Christopher's disability, meaningful benefit, in which educational
progress could be expected, was required. 120
Despite more than twenty years of interpretation, a clear definition of
"appropriate" remains elusive. In some circumstances, appropriate
education may provide opportunities approaching or even surpassing
those afforded non-disabled children. Yet for some severely disabled
children, no amount of instruction or services will enable them to
perform academically at the same level as their non-disabled peers.
Thus, the IDEA currently requires a case-by-case determination, the
substantive component of which lies between the provision of no
additional services and the provision of all services required to maximize
potential. Unless the Supreme Court or Congress choose to define
appropriate education more clearly, parents and educators will face
continued confusion and be forced repeatedly into court for resolution of
121
their conflicts under the IDEA.

2. Least Restrictive Environment
Superimposed on the requirement for appropriate education is an
equally elusive requirement for educating children in the least restrictive
environment. 122 The EAHCA called for handicapped children to be
Christopher's parents disputed his IEP because it substituted direct, hands-on physical
therapy with only consultative services. See id. at 173-74. The school district had
previously provided direct services, but unilaterally discontinued the practice throughout
the district. See id. Christopher's parents submitted evidence that physical therapy
services, provided at their own expense, were necessary for Christopher to progress and
had benefitted him. See id. at 174 & n.4.
118. See id. at 181-83. The court noted the difficulty in applying Rowley to this
case because Christopher's progress could not be measured in academic skills. "His
needs are drastically different, but no less important." Id. at l 82. Indeed, the EAHCA
required that the most severely handicapped (i.e., children like Christopher) be served
first. See id. at l 83.
119. See id. at 182 (finding that EAHCA authors "must have envisioned that
significant learning would transpire in the special education classroom . . . so that
citizens who would otherwise become burdens on the (S]tate would be transformed into
productive members of society"). In the case of Christopher Polk, learning was directed
toward the goal of self-sufficiency although he was "not likely ever to attain this coveted
status, no matter how excellent his educational program." Id.
120. See id. at 183. Although the Rowley Court emphasized procedural protection,
"it is clear that the Court was not espousing an entirely toothless standard of substantive
review." Id. at 179. Courts have a "responsibility for monitoring the substantive quality
of education .... [and] must ensure 'a basic floor of opportunity' that is defined by an
individualized program that confers benefit." Id. at 179.
121. See FULCHER, supra note 2, at 120.
122. The discussion below attempts only a cursory review of LRE principles,
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educated with children who are not handicapped "to the maximum
extent appropriate." 123 They should be segregated "only when the nature
or severity of the handicap is such that education in regular classes with
the use of s't.Pplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily."' As with FAPE, LRE could be interpreted to require a
potentially limitless number of supplemental services to achieve
satisfactory education in the regular classroom. As with FAPE, LRE
embraces both Equal Protection and substantive educational
components.
In the early years of special education, school districts found it
convenient and cost-effective to centralize instruction of disabled
students in separate classrooms or buildings. 125 Segregation of disabled
children, however, evokes concepts of discrimination rejected in Brown
12
127
v. Board of Education. ' Inclusion advocates argue that handicapped
children have a right to associate with non-handicapped peers. 12' Since
"separate but equal" 12' is inherently unequal under Brown, segregation
violates the spirit if not the letter of Fourteenth Amendment
constitutional protection."° Furthermore, increasing evidence suggests
positions, and interpretations. For more comprehensive and in-depth coverage, see
generally Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Special Educational Inclusion and the
Courts: A Proposal for a New Remedial Approach, 25 J.L. & Eouc. 523 (1996); Winter,
supra note 52; Perry A. Zirkel, The "Inclusion" Case Law: A Factor Analysis, 127
EDUC. L. REP. 533 (1998); Melvin, supra note 4.
123. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, sec.
5, § 612(5), 89 Stat. 773, 781; see Rebell & Hughes, supra note 122, at 547; Winter,
supra note 52, at 16.
124. Education for All Handicapped Children Act sec. 5, § 612(5).
125. See Goldman, supra note 5, at 263.
126. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see discussion infra Part III.
127. Although the terms "inclusion" and "mainstreaming" are sometimes used
interchangeably, for the purpose of this Comment, inclusion refers to situations in which
a disabled child's primary educational placement is in a regular classroom.
Mainstreaming refers to placing a child whose primary placement is in a segregated
environment into the general education population for part of the school day. See Anne
M. Hocutt, Effectiveness of Special Education: Is Placement a Critical Factor?, FUTURE
CHILDREN, Spring 1996, at 77, 78-79.
128. See Goldman, supra note 5, at 262 (stating LRE is intended to give children
the highest level of individual liberty); Melvin, supra note 4, at 610-12 (implicating a
First Amendment right of association and a liberty interest in reputation by avoiding
stigmatization).
129. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
130. See TURNBULL, supra note 2, at 158-60. The overall result of a dual system of
education has been a denial of educational opportunities for handicapped children,
including exclusion, misclassification, and inappropriate education. See id.; see also
Melvin, supra note 4, at 610 (noting that although the U.S. Supreme Court has not
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that inclusion confers independent educational and social benefits to the
child."' Children model other children's behavior and benefit from
interaction with appropriate non-disabled peer models. 132 This concept is
intuitively appealing: if one goal of education is to promote the ability to
participate productively in society, then children must have the
opportunity to practice social participation in school."'
Courts grappling with this issue have devised various balancing tests
to weigh the benefits of inclusion or mainstreaming with the burdens
134
imposed. In general, courts have placed the burden on school officials
recognized mentally retarded citizens as a suspect class, Congress has found that the
disabled are a "discrete and insular minority" who have historically faced purposeful
discrimination).
131. See Goldman, supra note 5, at 265 (citing evidence that students who are
included score in the 80th percentile academically as compared to the 50th percentile for
segregated students); see also Rebell & Hughes, supra note 122, at 533. The authors
quote G. Orville Johnson's observation:
It is indeed paradoxical that mentally handicapped children having teachers
especially trained, having more money (per capita) spent on their education,
and being enrolled in classes with fewer children and a program designed to
provide for their unique needs, should be accomplishing the objectives of their
education at the same or lower level than similar mentally handicapped
children who have not had these advantages and have been forced to remain in
the regular grades.
Id. (quoting G. Orville Johnson, Special Education for the Mentally Handicapped-A
Paradox, 22 EXCEPTIONAL CIIILD. 62, 66 (1962)).
132. See K. EILEEN ALLEN, THE EXCEPTIONAL CHILD: MAINSTREAMING IN EARLY
CHILDHOOD EDUCATION 129 (2d ed. 1991); Wyndol Furman & Leslie A. Gavin, Peers'
Influence on Adjustment and Development, in PEER RELATIONSHIPS IN CHILD
DEVELOPMENT 319, 331-32, 363-66 (Thomas J. Berndt & Gary W. Ladd eds., 1989).
133. In 1974, EAHCA author Senator Robert Stafford expressed support for
educating students in the "most normal possible and least restrictive setting, for how else
will they adapt to the world beyond the educational environment and how else will the
non-handicapped adapt to them." Goldman, supra note 5, at 261-62 (quoting 120 CONG.
REc. 58,438 (1974)).
134. For example, the Roncker test considers: 1) the benefit to the child of special
education placement versus regular education placement; 2) whether the child would
disrupt the regular education class; and 3) the cost of inclusion or mainstreaming. See
Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983). The Daniel R.R. test considers
first whether the child could be successfully educated in the regular classroom with the
use of supplemental aids and services. See Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d
1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989). If a court finds that the child must be placed outside the
regular classroom, then it must also decide whether the school has mainstreamed the
child to the maximum extent possible. See id. The Greer court adopted and built upon
Daniel R.R. by showing a strong preference for inclusion in the regular classroom. See
Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (I Ith Cir. 1991). Under Greer, school
districts must consider all supplemental aids and services that would permit a child to be
educated in the regular classroom. See id. The Third Circuit also adopted a test similar
to that in Daniel R.R., placing specific emphasis on the school district's obligation to
take meaningful rather than cursory efforts to mainstream a child. See Oberti v. Board of
Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215-18 (3d Cir. 1993). The Oberti court also directed that
schools should consider the social and emotional benefits of mainstreaming as well as
academic benefits. See id. The Ninth Circuit adopted a four part test. See Sacramento
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to justify removal of children from the general education environment,
especially when the disability is mild to moderate."' Schools must make
more than a token effort to provide supplemental aids and services."'
However, costs and resource allocation can be considered. 137 For
example, the Eighth Circuit's test does not require costs so great as to
"significantly impact upon the education of other children in the
district.""' Thus, LRE reflects a preference that, although strong, is
subordinate to the provision of FAPE and can be limited by the burdens
it imposes on schools.
D. The Move Toward Quality of Education
and the 1997 JDEA Amendments

In reviewing the history of special education, a central question that

City Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994).
Consideration is given to: 1) the academic benefits to the child of placement in the
regular classroom; 2) the non-academic benefits of inclusion; 3) the impact of the child
on the regular classroom; and 4) the cost of mainstreaming. See id.
135. See cases cited supra note 134; see also Rebell & Hughes, supra note 122, at
560-64 (summarizing recent trends in LRE cases).
136. See Rebell & Hughes, supra note 122, at 560-64; Melvin, supra note 4, at 654.
137. See Rebell & Hughes, supra note 122, at 563-64; Melvin, supra note 4, at 65556.
138. Greer, 950 F.2d at 697. Note, however, that cost can only be considered when
choosing between two appropriate placements (i.e., a more restrictive, but appropriate,
placement and a less restrictive alternative). The threshold question is whether there is
more than one appropriate placement; if only one placement is deemed appropriate,
school districts cannot deny FAPE to a child because of cost. Compare, for example, the
recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Cedar Rapids Community School District v.
Garret F., 119 S. Ct. 992 (1999). In that case, the school district argued that it should be
allowed to consider cost-based factors in deciding whether to provide necessary healthrelated services to a disabled child (such as ventilator support, urinary catheterization,
suctioning of tracheotomy tubes, and other services). See id. at 995-99. The Court held
that the school district could not consider such costs. See id. at 999-1000. The
fundamental difference between Garret F. and LRE cases is that the disputed services in
Garret F. were not optional-Garret would require them to participate in any placement.
See id. at 1000. Thus, the narrow statutory issue the Court considered was whether the
services Garret required fell under the medical care exception of IDEA. See id. at 997.
The Court affirmed its earlier unanimous ruling in Irving Independent School District v.
Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984), in which it drew a bright line between related health services
(that a district is required to provide) and medical services (not required). See Garret F.,
119 S. Ct. at 997-98. Medical services, the Court concluded, are those which must be
delivered by a physician. See Garret F., 119 S. Ct. at 997-98; Tatro, 468 U.S. at 892-94.
Since Garret's needs could be addressed by a nurse or other staff, the school district was
responsible for their provision, regardless of the cost. See Garret F., 119 S. Ct. at 9991000.
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arises is what has been gained from the IDEA? Has the implementation
of procedural safeguards and stringent requirements for FAPE and LRE,
buttressed by federal funding, achieved the goals originally envisioned?
The House Committee Report prepared for the 1997 reauthorization of
the IDEA concludes that the Act has been very successful indeed.'"
Since 1975, the number of disabled children in state institutions has
declined by close to ninety percent; higher education for disabled young
adults has tripled; and unemployment has been reduced.''° Yet, the
report also notes that the IDEA is far from perfect: school officials and
others complain that the current law is unclear and focuses too much on
paperwork and process rather than on improving results for children."'
Furthermore, the number of disabled students who fail is disappointingly
high, with twice as many dropping out of school as compared to nondisabled students. 142 The report concludes that "the promise of the law
143
has not been fulfilled for too many children with disabilities."
It is
interesting to note the House Committee's attention to outcomes as the
measure of success for an Act that prescribes only input criteria. In
parallel to the changing priorities of parents, as reflected in litigation,
congressional attention has shifted from merely opening the doors of
education to a more active inquiry into what happens within.
The 1997 amendments to IDEA (IDEA 97) provide a myriad of
improvements to increase the quality of education for disabled
children. 144 Of great significance are congressional requirements that
139. See H. REP. No. 105-95, at 84 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 81.
140. See id. The reader is cautioned, however, not to over-interpret such
observations without direct evidence of a causal relationship. For example, widespread
deinstitutionalization of the developmentally disabled in California during the 1990s did
not occur as a result of increased educational opportunities. See JAMES W. CONROY ET
AL., THE COFFELT LONGITUDINAL STUDY: THE RESULTS OF FOUR YEARS OF MOVEMENT
FROM INSTITUTION TO COMMUNITY, REPORT TO THE CA DEPT. OF DEVELOPMENTAL
SERVICES (July 1998). Rather, the driving force was a lawsuit alleging harm to
individuals in the care of large state-operated facilities. See id.
141. See H. REP. No. 105-95, at 85, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 82.
142. See id. at 85, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 82. The National Center on
Educational Outcomes reports that disabled students who drop out are less likely to be
competitively employed and more likely to be arrested than disabled students who do not
drop out. See Geenen et al., supra note 11, at 17. Disabled youth are more likely than
their non-disabled counterparts to be working at lower-status, menial jobs, and less likely
to be attending post-secondary education or living independently. See id.
143. H. REP. No. 105-95, at 85, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 82.
144. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L.
105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (codified at 20 U.S.C. 1400 (Supp. III 1997)). In addition to those
mentioned in the text, the IDEA 97 amendments make numerous other changes which
are outside the scope of this Comment. See id. For a discussion of such controversial
provisions as the new discipline rules under the IDEA 97, see generally Theresa J.
Bryant, The Death Knell for School Expulsion: The I 997 Amendments to the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 487 (1998); Dixie Snow Huefner,
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, 122 EDUC. L. REP.
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students with disabilities be included in statewide achievement tests. 145
States must establish performance goals and indicators to judge progress
of children with disabilities. 146 Disabled students' scores must now be
reported to parents and the public, and beginning July 1, 2000,
alternative testing must be in place for students unable to participate in
standardized assessments. 147 These provisions will enable parents and
educators to begin measuring and assessing the effectiveness of
education for disabled children, and track the progress individual
students make. They demonstrate renewed congressional commitment
to improving the quality of education for disabled students and
improving outcomes. However, they are only a first step toward making
actual improvements and holding schools accountable for educational
quality.
In addition, Congress has re-emphasized its preference for the
inclusion of disabled students with non-disabled peers. IEPs must now
provide a statement of reasons when students are not educated in the
regular classroom. 148 This requirement shifts the burden to schools to
demonstrate that they have considered all supports and services available
to enable a child to be educated in the regular classroom. General
education teachers must now participate in IBP teams for mainstreamed
or included students, reenforcing the cooperative nature of general and
special education. 149 States must now make assurances that special
education funding mechanisms are placement-neutral, consistent with
1 0
educating disabled children in the least restrictive environment. '
Furthermore, language permitting general education students to receive
incidental benefits from special education services has been added."'
Previously, schools were strictly prohibited from using IDEA funds for
1103 (1998); Christopher Kraus, Application of the "Stay Put" Provision of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) to Students with Undetected
Disabilities, KY. CHILDREN'S RTS. J., Fall 1997, at l; Julie F. Mead, Expressions of
Congressional Intent: Examining the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA, 127 EDUC. L. REP.
511 (1998); Eyer, supra note 10.
145. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments § 612(a)(17)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(]7) (Supp. III 1997)).
146. See id. § 612(a)(16) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(16) (Supp. III 1997)).
147. See id.§ 612(a)(]7) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(]7) (Supp. III 1997)).
148. See id. § 614(d)(l)(A){iv) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(iv) (Supp. III
1997)).
149. See id. § 614(d)(])(B)(ii) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(B)(ii) (Supp. III
1997)).
150. See id. § 612(a)(5)(B) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(b) (Supp. III 1997)).
151. See id.§ 613(a)(4) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § l413(a)(4) (Supp. III 1997)).
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general education purposes, and school districts were often reluctant to
place a disabled child in the regular education classroom for fear of
. fun d"mg. 152
1osmg
Nevertheless, the IDEA 97 amendments still fall short of establishing
definitive educational standards for disabled children. Congress has
failed to define appropriate education or provide guidance on Rowley.
Thus, states remain charged with defining educational standards for
disabled children and devising methods for their implementation.
Furthermore, according to the National Center on Educational
Outcomes, the compliance-based procedures of the IDEA do not address
the real issue of accountability by ignoring the important question: "Is
the student learning?"'" Instead, the IDEA only asks: "Is the student
getting the services written on the IEP?" 154
This Comment asserts that a central reason Congress has deferred to
the states for substantive and qualitative elements of education may be
found in constitutional principles-specifically, that education is
primarily a state, rather than a federal responsibility. 155 We should
expect that federal statutes will never ensure adequate education for
disabled students nor will courts impose such a duty based on federal
statutes, such as the IDEA. The result and relief that parents of disabled
students truly seek-adequate educational outcomes for their childrenis more appropriately addressed in the state forum. As detailed below,
this Comment asserts that state constitutions, especially that of
California, provide ample basis to support such demands.
III. GENERAL EDUCATION REFORM AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ADEQUACY STANDARDS BASED ON STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS

The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education"•
heralded the beginning of modem reform in general education. In
152. See Margaret J. McLaughlin & Deborah A. Verstegen, Increasing Regulatory
Flexibility of Special Education Programs: Problems and Promising Strategies, 64
EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 371, 378 (1998); see also Willard, supra note 61, at 1179-82
(discussing the impact of various funding formulas on the provision of special education
and related services).
153. JUDITH L. ELLIOTT & MARTHA L. THURLOW, OPENING THE DoOR TO
EDUCATIONAL
REFORM:
UNDERSTANDING
EDUCATIONAL
ASSESSMENT
AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 7 (Nat'I Ctr. on Educ. Outcomes, Univ. of Minn., Minneapolis, Minn.
1997), microformed on ERIC, Fiche ED 412 693 (ERIC Document Reprod. Serv .,
Computer Microfilm Int'I Corp.) [hereinafter ELLIOTT & THURLOW, ASSESSMENT AND
ACCOUNTABILITY].
154. Id.
155. See discussion infra Part III.
156. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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rejecting the "separate but equal" doctrine announced in Plessy v.
Ferguson,"' the Court dismissed arguments that the Fourteenth
Amendment should be interpreted in light of the circumstances
surrounding its adoption."' Specifically, "[e]ducation of Negroes was
almost nonexistent" in the late nineteenth century,"• much as education
0
of the disabled was virtually nonexistent in the mid-twentieth century. "
The Brown Court held that the educational segregation of children,
solely on the basis of race, was indeed an unconstitutional denial of
Equal Protection because "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
161
unequal."
Thus, this landmark decision established a right to equal access to
education under the United States Constitution. Yet in describing education as
162
"perhaps the most important function of state and local govemments,"
and further limiting the right to equal opportunity in education to
circumstances where "the [S]tate has undertaken to provide it,"163 the
Supreme Court foretold of the limits it would subsequently impose on
. h t. ,..
that ng
A. The First Wave: Equality

165

In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 166 the Court
declined to extend the Equal Protection guarantee to economically
disadvantaged students. 167 Texas students had successfully challenged
157. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
158. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 489.
159. Id. at 490.
160. See discussion supra Part IL
161. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
162. Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
163. Id.
164. See discussion infra Part III.A.
165. Modem education finance reform has been described as consisting of three
waves: the first wave focused on U.S. Constitutional Equal Protection; the second wave
consisted of state equal protection challenges; and the third wave emphasizes state
education clauses as the basis for reform efforts. See generally William E. Thro,
Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The
Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REv. 597 (1994) (using Massachusetts as
an example of the current third wave focus of education reform); William E. Thro, The
Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on Public
School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219 (1990) (describing trends in
education reform since 1971 and characterizing, for the first time, the three successive
"waves").
166. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
167. See id. at 1-59.
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the state system of financing public education based on local property
tax revenues in the lower court. 168 Plaintiffs had argued that educational
opportunities were limited by the wealth of the district in which a
student lived, unfairly depriving students residing in poor districts of
opportunities afforded wealthier students. 169 The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, finding no explicit reference to education in the Constitution,
ruled that education was not a "fundamental ri9.ht" deserving strict
judicial scrutiny of discriminatory state action.' ° Citing historical
deference to legislative control over economic issues, the Court also
declined to define wealth as a "suspect" classification. 171 Thus, the
Texas system for financing education was subjected to a lesser, "rational
relationship" test. 172 Since the school finance system was found to bear a
rational relationship to the legitimate state interest of promoting local
control over schools, it passed the test of constitutionality .173
In Plyler v. Doe,' 14 the U.S. Supreme Court conceded that a minimum
educational threshold exists for which federal protection will be granted,
even where express constitutional protection is absent."' In Plyler,
undocumented alien children in Texas were completely denied public
176
education.
Declining to reverse its earlier ruling that education was
177
not a fundamental right, the Court nevertheless overturned the Texas
education statute, finding that a total deprivation of education to one
group could not be justified by furthering a substantial state interest.'"
One commentator has argued that the Rodriguez Court "virtually
abdicated any role for the federal courts in guaranteeing education rights
under the Federal Constitution.""' Thus, plaintiffs would be forced
168. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 280-86
(W.D. Tex. 1971).
169. See id. at 281-82.
170. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. at 37; see id. at 28-39.
171. Id. at 28; see id. at 28-40. Justice Powell also noted the Court's reluctance to
interfere in state education matters because of its "lack of specialized knowledge and
experience" regarding the "persistent and difficult questions of educational policy." Id.
at 42. It is interesting to note that the Court cited the lack of agreement amongst scholars
and experts "[ o ]n even the most basic questions" in education as a reason for such
deference, suggesting, perhaps, that a court's interference might be considered less
"premature," given a greater consensus on basic issues in the field of education. Id.
172. Id. at 40.
173. See id. at 55.
174. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
175. See id. at 202-30.
176. See id. at 205.
177. See id. at 223. The Court also declined to extend suspect class status to
undocumented aliens because their presence in the United States, in violation of federal
law, was not a "constitutional irrelevancy." Id.
178. See id. at 230.
179. Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State
Constitutional ww, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1329 (1992).
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"[in]to state courts ... for the change they seek.""0 Yet the Plyler
decision confirmed the suggestion in Rodriguez that "some identifiable
quantum of education"" 1 was constitutionally protected in order to
"provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal
skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process." 1"
Furthermore, in directing
plaintiffs away from federal courts and into state courts for relief, the
Rodriguez and Plyler decisions also suggested the future direction such
challenges might take: away from educational equality and into the arena
of adequacy defined by the minimum quantum of education necessary to
develop basic skills.
B.

The Second Wave: State Courts

The first step in this direction was to move the controversy from the
federal to the state arena-from the United States Constitution to the
constitutions of individual states. 183 Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the
constitutions of each of the fifty states contain direct references to
184
education.
The foundational controversy for state constitutional protection of
education was that of Serrano v. Priest. 185 In Serrano I, the California
Supreme Court struck down state education financing substantially
similar to that of Texas on the grounds that it violated Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection guarantees, and thus ordered the
legislature to revise appropriate statutes. 186 Subsequent legislative efforts
were found inadequate by the trial court and the California Supreme
180. See Robert M. Jensen, Advancing Education Through Education Clauses of
State Constitutions, 1997 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 10 (citing Alexandra Natapoff,
Commentary, The Year of living Dangerously: State Courts Expand the Right to
Education, 92 EDUC. L. REP. 755, 756 (1994)).
181.
182.
183.

San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973).

Id. at 37.
See, e.g., Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance litigation, and
the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1157-59 (1995).
184. See Jensen, supra note 180, at 3; see also MARIHA M. McCARIHY & PAUL T.
DEIGNAN, WHAT LEGALLY CONSTITUTES AN ADEQUATE PUBLIC EDUCATION? A REVIEW
OF CONSTITUTIONAL, LEGISLATIVE, AND JUDICIAL MANDATES 120 app. B (1982) (listing
education clause language from all 50 state constitutions).
185. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano[), 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Serrano v. Priest
(Serrano[[), 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907
(1977); Serrano v. Priest (Serrano III), 226 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Ct. App. 1986).
186. See Serrano!, 487 P.2d at 1265-66. Note that Serrano I was decided two
years before the U.S. Supreme Court's I 973 decision in Rodriguez.
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Court again reviewed this case."' Conceding that Rodriguez undercut
the Serrano I decision insofar as it relied on the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment,"' the Serrano II court nevertheless held
that the children of California were guaranteed a fundamental right to
education under the California Constitution. 189 The court further held
that wealth was a suspect classification and applied a standard of strict
judicial scrutiny to determine whether the educational reforms enacted
by the Legislature pursuant to Serrano I complied with state equal
protection provisions. 190
Finding such reforms insufficient, the
Legislature was compelled to reduce educational expenditure disparities
per pupil to insignificant levels. 191
Following the success of equal protection arguments in Serrano II,
similar challenges to education financing were raised in a number of
other states, with varying degrees of success. 192 Although a limited
number of state supreme courts have struck down educational financing
based primarily on state constitutional guarantees of equal protection,
the majority of decisions have looked unfavorably on arguments based
solely on equality."' Yet, having found entry at the courthouse door
through state constitutions, education reformers persisted.
C.

The Third Wave: Adequacy

194

The "third wave" of education reform has seized upon the U.S.
Supreme Court's suggestion that a minimum quantum of education
might be constitutionally protected. Rather than relying on implicit
guarantees of federal law, however, the third wave focuses on explicit
provisions of state constitution education clauses."' Such arguments
assert that state constitution education clauses demand a qualitative level
of educational offering. 196 Terms such as "efficient," "thorough," and
"uniform" have been interpreted as standards against which adequacy is
187. See Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 939-940.
188. See id. at 949.
189. See id. at950-51.
190. See id. at 950-53.
191. See id. at 953, 957-58; see also Serrano v. Priest (Serrano Ill), 226 Cal. Rptr.
584, 620 (Ct. App. 1986) (subsequently finding that the California Legislature had met
its constitutional burdens with newly passed education finance legislation by reducing
wealth-related disparities to insignificance).
I 92. See Jensen, supra note 180, at 9-18 (comparing the successes of challenges to
state education financing systems).
193. See id.
194. See Heise, supra note 183, at 1152-53 (describing how third wave litigation
concentrates on state education clauses instead of equal protection clauses).
195. See id.
196. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REv. 101, 108-09 (1995); Jensen, supra note 180, at 18-19.
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1

measured. "
Among the first states to interpret an adequacy standard in its state
constitution's education clause was West Virginia. In Pauley v. Kelly,1"
the West Virginia Supreme Court sought to define "thorough and
efficient" as found in article XII, section I of the West Virginia
199
Constitution.
Following an extensive legal and lexical analysis, the
Pauley court adopted the following definition of a thorough and efficient
education system: "It develops, as best the state of education expertise
allows, the minds, bodies and social morality of its charges to prepare
them for useful and ha1&fy occupations, recreation and citizenship, and
does so economically."' The court then enumerated areas of education
that a thorough and efficient system should develop to full potential: 1)
literacy; 2) mathematical ability; 3) knowledge of government sufficient
to equip the individual to make informed choices as a citizen; 4) selfknowledge sufficient to intelligently choose life work; 5) vocational or
advanced academic training; 6) recreational pursuits; 7) creative
201
interests; and 8) social ethics.
Judicial interpretations in more than a dozen states have now read
quality assurances into the education clauses of their respective state
202
constitutions.
Yet none has had a greater impact than the Kentucky
197. Jensen, supra note 180, at 4-5 (describing language found in various state
constitution education clauses); William E. Thro, The Role of Language of the State
Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 79 Eouc. L. REP. 19, 25-27 (1993)
(analyzing courts' interpretation of state education clause language).
198. 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
199. Id. at 861. "The legislature shall provide, by general law, for a thorough and
efficient system of free schools." W. VA. CONST. art. XII,§ I.
200. Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877.
201. See id.
202. See Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 107 (Ala. 1993) (holding
state provision of substantially equitable and adequate educational opportunities to
schoolchildren is constitutionally required); Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v.
Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 812-15 (Ariz. 1994) (holding constitutional requirement of the
State to provide general and uniform public school system that must be adequate); Idaho
Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 734-35 (Idaho 1993) (holding
constitutional requirement that Legislature provide for a thorough system of education
that meets standards established by the State Board of Education); Rose v. Council for
Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989) (holding constitutional mandate to
provide an efficient system of common schools requires equal opportunity for children to
have an adequate education); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ.,
615 N.E.2d 516, 548, 554-55 (Mass. 1993) (holding constitutional obligation of
Commonwealth to provide all public school students with adequate education);
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1376 (N.H. 1993) (holding duty of the
State to provide a constitutionally adequate education to every educable child in the
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Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc. 20'
The plaintiffs in Rose comprised a non-profit corporation whose
membership consisted of sixty-six local school districts from
economically poor areas of Kentucky, a number of individual school
districts, and twenty-two individual students on behalf of a class of
similarly situated students. 204 The original complaint was based on state
equal protection grounds, but also maintained that the entire system of
education in Kentucky was not "efficient" as required by the Kentucky
20
Constitution. ' The Kentucky Supreme Court, however, found for the
plaintiffs exclusively on the ground that the Kentucky school system
failed to meet the efficiency standard.""'
In defining efficiency, the court rejected interpretations requiring only
that schools operate "as best as can be with the money that was
provided."207 Efficient education was found to have the goal of
developing at least seven specifically enumerated capacities. 208
public schools); Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575, 579 (N.J. 1994) (holding school
children of State entitled to constitutionally-prescribed quality of education); Leandro v.
State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997) (holding state constitution guarantees every child
of the State the opportunity to receive a sound basic education); Bismarck Pub. Sch.
Dist. I v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 259-63 (N.D. 1994) (holding fundamental right to
education establishes goal of equal educational opportunities as measured by qualitative
standards); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 740-46 (Ohio 1997) (holding state
constitution mandates a thorough and efficient education which will provide each student
basic quality education); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139,
150-51 (Tenn. 1993) (holding education clause of state constitution is an enforceable
standard for education that the Legislature must meet); Carrollton-Farmers Branch
Indep. Sch. Dist v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 527 (Tex. 1992)
(holding constitutional mandates for efficient schools prescribe a minimally adequate
education for all Texas school children); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71,
96-97 (Wash. 1978) (holding Legislature has mandatory constitutional duty to provide
basic education); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) (holding thorough
and efficient clause of state constitution requires Legislature to establish and meet high
quality education standards); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279
(Wyo. 1995) (holding the opportunity for quality education is the Legislature's
paramount priority).
203. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
204. See id. at 190.
205. Id. "The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an
efficient system of common schools throughout the State." KY. CONST.§ 183.
206. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215.
207. Id. at 211. The court reasoned that such a definition "could result in a system
of common schools, efficient only in the uniformly deplorable conditions it provides
throughout the state." Id.
208. See id. at 2 I 2. The capacities the court listed were:
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to
function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient
knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to
make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her
community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of
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Furthermore, the minimum characteristics of an efficient system of
schools required:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

8)
9)

The establishment, maintenance and funding of common schools in
Kentucky is the sole responsibility of the General Assembly.
Common schools shall be free to all.
Common schools shall be available to all Kentucky children.
Common schools shall be substantially uniform throughout the state.
Common schools shall provide equal educational opportunities to all
Kentucky children, regardless of place of residence or economic
circumstances.
Common schools shall be monitored by the General Assembly to assure
that they are operated with no waste, no duplication, no mismanagement,
and with no political influence.
The premise for the existence of common schools is that all children in
Kentucky have a constitutional right to an adequate education.
The General Assembly shall provide funding which is sufficient to provide
each child in Kentucky an adequate education.
An adequate education is one which has as its goal the development of the
seven capacities recited previously .21"

Given this definition, the Kentucky Supreme Court determined that the
210
system of education was not efficient.
In reaching this decision, the court relied on three areas of
information: first, the overall inadequacy of educational outcomes for
students in Kentucky as compared to national standards; second, the
disparity in educational opportunities throughout the state; and third,
both the geographic disparity and overall inadequacy of education
211
financing throughout the state.
Failing constitutional efficiency, the
entire statutory system of education was declared unconstitutional."'
The Rose court rejected arguments that the Legislature had acted with
the intent to provide adequate education and had been making progress
in that direction."' The critical issue for the court was a finding that the
his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to
enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi)
sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either academic or
vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work
intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to
enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.
Id.
209.
2!0.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 212-13.
See id. at 215.
See id. at 213.
See id. at 215.
See id. at 195-99 (acknowledging that although the General Assembly had
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effect of Kentucky education law was an unconstitutionally inefficient
system of education. 214 Recognizing the separation of powers required
under Kentucky law, the court ruled that its duty was fulfilled by
determining the constitutional validity of the education system-it was
then the duty of the Legislature to enact a constitutionally valid system
of education."'
D. The Appeal of Adequacy

Arguments based on state constitutional claims of inadequate
education have been remarkably successful. In a 1997 analysis of state
supreme court decisions, Robert Jensen found that arguments based
solely on adequacy had a one hundred percent success rate. 216 Those that
focused on poor educational quality in combination with equal
protection guarantees were sixty-six percent successful, while those that
relied solely on equality of spending succeeded only twenty-six percent
211
of the time.
In some cases, courts have even found a constitutional
duty of adequacy where such a claim was not asserted by the plaintiffs. 218
21
In Bismarck Public School District v. State, ' for example, plaintiffs
challenged North Dakota's statutory method for distributing funding to
public schools as violating state equal protection guarantees. 220 The

made substantial efforts to improve education, education in Kentucky was still
inadequate and inefficient in spite of, and in some cases exacerbated by, legislative
efforts).
214. See id. at 215.
2 I 5. See id. at 212-14. The court stated "Our job is to determine the constitutional
validity of the system .... We have done so .... It is now up to the General Assembly
to re-create, and re-establish a system of common schools within this state which will be
in compliance with the Constitution." Id. at 214.
216. See Jensen, supra note 180, at 20, app. at 47.
217. See id.
218. See. e.g., Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 730
(Idaho 1993) (noting that plaintiffs' alleged claims of inadequacy would have entitled
them to relief, although only an equal protection claim was litigated); Thompson v.
Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 640-41, 652-53 (Idaho 1975) (mandating that a minimal level
of basic education be supported when faced with an equal spending claim); Gould v. Orr,
506 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb. 1993) (finding that although plaintiffs alleged unequal
education funding, they did not prove that as a result of alleged unequal funding students
were deprived of constitutionally required adequate education); see also Hubsch, supra
note 179, at 1336 ("[S]ome state supreme courts have expressed surprise that the
plaintiffs pursued equality rather than quality claims under the education articles.");
Jensen, supra note 180, at 19-21 (discussing courts' preference for qualitative arguments
over equalitative arguments); Joshua S. Wyner, Toward a Common Law Theory of
Minimal Adequacy in Public Education, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 389, 401-02
(1994) (remarking that it was "curious" for the Engelking court to read an adequacy
standard into the state constitution when that issue was not before it).
219. 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994).
220. See id. at 248.
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North Dakota Supreme Court, however, focused its analysis on
education quality as measured by student opportunities and outcomes."'
Finding educational quality inadequate, the Bismarck court ruled that
"the existing system of educational funding needs fixing. "222
The appeal of adequacy and its concomitant success in state courts has
been attributed to a number of factors."' The explicit source of
adequacy claims found in state constitution education clauses at once
imposes both a specific duty upon states and a limitation to that duty.
Because adequacy arguments flow directly from constitutional mandates
in state education clauses,224 they do not threaten a "spill-over" effect
into other areas of governmental responsibility."' It is unlikely that
demands based on constitutional references to some basic quantum of
educational quality would lead to similar demands to provide roads or
sewers or police protection of similar quality in all districts. State equal
. arguments, however, have raise
. d sueh concerns. 22'
protect10n
Furthermore, challenges based on the education clauses of state
constitutions are considered fully within state supreme courts'
competence. 227 Quality lawsuits require that courts directly address the
question of whether a state's education system fulfills its constitutional
mandate."' Although some courts have elaborated specific criteria for
educational adequacy, others consider their obligations met by simply
determining whether state education programs are constitutional or
unconstitutional."' In contrast, education finance lawsuits ask courts to
221. See id. at 261-62.
222. Id. at 262.
223. See Enrich, supra note 196, at 166-70 (arguing adequacy's superiority over
equality); Jensen, supra note 180, at 34-40 (discussing problems with equality arguments
and the advantages of quality arguments).
224. See Enrich, supra note 196, at 166; Heise, supra note 183, at 1158; see also
Enrich, supra note 196, at 168 (asserting that the limited scope of education clause
arguments is less threatening than broader equal protection-based arguments).
225. Enrich, supra note 196, at 166; see also Wyner, supra note 218, at 393
(arguing that the reluctance of many courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court in
Rodriguez, to impose a duty to fund education equally resulted from fears that such
decisions could lead to similar assertions in other areas of government).
226. See Enrich, supra note 196, at 166-68.
227. See, e.g., Enrich, supra note 196, at 171-72; Jensen, supra note 180, at 34-35;
Wyner, supra note 218, at 404-07.
228. See Enrich, supra note 196, at 166-67 (asserting that construction of education
clause adequacy requirements is simple in contrast to the "interpretive heroics" that are
necessary to "navigate the elaborate doctrinal structures that have evolved to contain
equality's disruptive potential").
229. Compare, for example, Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d
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pass judgment on legislative spending decisions, from which they
frequently retreat on separation of powers grounds. 230
Adequate education describes the basic floor of opportunity that a
state must provide to students rather than the ceiling. 231 The State is free,
in times of financial excess, to improve education beyond the minimum
required level. Similarly, local communities retain the ability to
dedicate additional resources to schools, provided the State has ensured
a reasonable quality of education for all its residents. Thus, adequacy
claims do not require "levelling" of resources in such a way that the
"worse off can only be improved at the expense of the better off." 232
The test for adequacy is whether the education provided is sufficient
for its intended purpose. In this regard, it is closely aligned with the
primary governmental purposes for providing education: to ensure a
productive populace that is fully capable of participating in society,
thereby promising economic and social gains for all members of that
•
233
society.
By focusing on outcomes, adequacy obviates the debate over
measuring, comparing, and objectively equalizing inputs."' Moreover,
the success of such arguments reflects a realization that students'
opportunity to learn encomf,asses factors in addition to the resources
allocated to their education.' ' More simply stated, adequacy promises to
186 (Ky. 1989), with Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), and subsequent
litigation in Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998). In Rose, the Kentucky Supreme
Court specifically enumerated nine characteristics of adequate education and seven
capacities such education should promote. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying
text. The Kentucky Legislature acted accordingly by enacting the Kentucky Education
Reform Act. See discussion infra notes 426-29 and accompanying text. In contrast, the
New Jersey Supreme Court simply stated that the "[c]onstitution's guarantee must be
understood to embrace that educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary
setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market."
Robinson, 303 A.2d at 295 (noting also that the State had "never spelled out the content
of educational opportunity the Constitution requires"). It is interesting to note that the
simpler "yes" or "no" type of decision rendered in Robinson has resulted in nearly
continuous litigation over the constitutionality of New Jersey's education system since
1970. See Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 450-65 (N.J. 1998) (reviewing the long
history of Robinson and Abbott decisions).
230. See Wyner, supra note 218, at 404-07; see also Jensen, supra note 180, at 2
(observing that although all education litigation is inevitably financial in nature, and
thereby "legislative" to some extent, quality lawsuits can untangle education without
requiring courts to legislate school finance issues).
231. See Enrich, supra note I 96, at 168-70.
232. Id. at 168.
233. See id. at 168-69.
234. See id. at 145-55, 168-70 (discussing the many ways, other than strict equality
of spending, in which educational equality can be measured, and suggesting that the
simplicity of adequacy is less threatening to governmental bureaucracies than the
complexities of equality).
235. See id.
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generate sought-after change where school finance lawsuits have
failed."'
Adequacy arguments are especially appealing for special education.
They place the duty where it should be-on individual states rather than
the federal government. The IDEA intended to further national interest
in the education of disabled children, but never intended to supplant the
authority of states in providing such education. 237 It was intended to
encourage specific aims, not mandate a particular method of instruction
or guarantee outcomes."' The IDEA anticipates that states will adopt
standards and procedures not simply because the federal statute provides
funds if they do, but because it is ultimately their responsibility to do
so. 239
In comparison to equal protection, adequacy is also superior for
disabled students. Strict and absolute equality, especially equality of
funding, rings hollow for the disabled student. Varying degrees of
disability and the unique needs of each child necessarily require different
levels of attention and spending.'"' To require that schools spend equal
amounts on each student would clearly not produce equality of
opportunity nor basic adequacy of education for many disabled students.
In addition, adequacy is a collective rather than an individualized
obligation. By comparison, the IDEA focuses on the specific needs of
each individual child. It must necessarily be limited to inputs and
procedure; requiring a state or local education agency to achieve
competence from every child or from any given child would be an
236. See Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the
Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative
Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543, 584 (1998).
237. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142,
sec. 3, § 60l(b)(8)-(c), 89 Stat. 773, 775 ("State and local education agencies have a
responsibility to provide education for all handicapped children . . . . It is the purpose of
this Act to ... assist States and localities to provide for the education of all handicapped
children .... ").
238. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207-09 & n.30 (1982). The
Rowley Court found that "[q]uestions of methodology are for resolution by the [s]tates."
Id. at 208. Congress recognized that special education is "not guaranteed to produce any
particular outcome." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 94-168, at 11-12 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1435-36).
239. See id. at 208 (noting that IDEA specifically charges states with such
responsibilities and that it was not Congress's intention in passing the Act to "displace
the primacy of [s]tates in the field of education").
240. See Heise, supra note I 83, at 1169 (noting that students with different
educational needs impose varying costs on school systems that states typically
accommodate with weighted funding formulas).
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impossible burden to impose."' To require that the State ensure student
outputs that collectively achieve a given level of competence, as limited
by statistically normal distribution, however, is an entirely reasonable
expectation.
This is not to suggest that we should discard the tenets of the IDEA in
favor of a lesser standard, or that adequacy would diminish the
procedural safeguards the IDEA established. Indeed, in its highest form,
adequacy would make the IDEA obsolete. Adequate education would
necessarily be appropriate to the child's needs or it could not possibly
achieve the requisite outcome. By focusing on quality, local school
districts and state agencies would be compelled to cooperate with
parents to achieve an acceptable result rather than conflict over services
provided and methodologies used. The ambiguous "some benefit"
would be replaced by a more tangible, measurable standard of sufficient
benefit to meet concrete state standards. Least restrictive environment
would be seen as a substantive component of a child's education
designed to enable him to function as a productive member of society.
In short, parental objectives and state constitutional duties would be
more closely aligned under the substantive protection of an adequacy
standard than under the procedural safeguards of the IDEA as currently
implemented.
Thus, parents of students in special education should begin to look not
to the United States government for high quality education, but to the
service provider. They should direct their concerns for quality to the
source of educational obligations-the states and their respective
constitutions.
IV. DOES THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REQUIRE
EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY?

In

analyzing

the

educational obligations

of a state

to its

241. Courts have generally rejected individual students' claims of educational
negligence and malpractice against school districts and educators on public policy
grounds. See Frank D. Aquila, Educational Malpractice: A Tort En Ventre, 39 CLEV.
Sr. L. REV. 323, 342-46 (1991); Catherine D. McBride, Note, Educational Malpractice:
Judicial Recognition of a Limited Duty of Educators Toward Individual Students; A State
Law Cause of Action for Educational Negligence, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 475, 483-87.
Courts cite their unwillingness to interfere with school administration, the lack of
standards of care for educators, the difficulty in distinguishing between the many factors
that can affect students outcomes, and the burden of increased litigation as reasons for
denying a private cause of action by an individual for failure to educate. See Aquila,
supra, at 342-45; McBride, supra, at 483-87. Note, however, the authors would
establish an exception to this rule in the case of special education situations because the
EAHCA/IDEA obviates many of these concerns. See Aquila, supra, at 345-51;
McBride, supra, at 487-93.
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schoolchildren, the first question that must be addressed is whether a
state constitution requires the provision of adequate education. This
section explores the Education Clause of the California Constitution for
qualitative promise.
Before a duty to provide adequate education can be interpreted into a
state's constitution, courts must find a duty to provide education-they
must generally find that education is a fundamental state right."' It is
also necessary for courts to define the role of the Legislature in fulfilling
its state constitutional obligations. Finally, it is useful for the state court
to hold that education must be provided essentially equally to all
children, and to define circumstances under which it could or could not
be denied.
California enjoys the enviable position that many of these threshold
questions surrounding a duty to provide adequate education have already
been addressed."' Education has been held a fundamental interest under
the California Constitution, thus guaranteeing students equal protection
144
under strict judicial scrutiny. In addition, wealth has been held to be a
suspect classification requiring the state's school financing plan to
245
distribute funds for education in a substantially equal manner .
Although declining to mandate a particular formula for educational
spending, the California Supreme Court has found no problem with the
legitimacy of ordering the Legislature to effect a constitutionally valid
.
246
fu nd mg system.
In recent years, the California Supreme Court has neither retreated
from its Serrano decisions nor hesitated to impose even greater duties on
the State in furtherance of education. In Butt v. State,"' the court
242. Most courts that read an adequacy standard into their state's constitution have
found that the right to education is fundamental. See cases cited supra note 202. The
Idaho Supreme Court, however, found that the State Legislature had a duty to provide a
thorough and uniform system of schools, although citizens of the state did not have a
corresponding affirmative right to receive education. See Thompson v. Engelking, 537
P.2d 635, 647-48 (Idaho 1975).
243. See supra Part 111.B (discussing Serrano litigation).
244. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I[), 557 P.2d 929, 951, 958 (Cal. 1976), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
245. See id.
246. See id. at 939-40, 957-58.
247. 842 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1992). In Butt, the Richmond Unified School District
announced it would close schools six weeks before the scheduled end of the 1990-1991
school year due to a lack of funds caused by local mismanagement. See id. Plaintiffs
asserted that the State of California was responsible for ensuring that Richmond schools
remained open, on the grounds that closure would deprive them of equal protection of
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reaffirmed education as a "uniquely fundamental personal interest,"248
but also stressed that "the State's responsibility ... extends beyond the
detached role of fair funder or fair legislator."249 Thus in Butt, when the
Richmond Unified School District was threatened with closure six
weeks before the end of the school year, the State had a duty to take
remedial action despite the fact that Richmond's fiscal insolvency was
caused by local mismanagement."0 The court based its decision on the
right of Richmond's students to "basic educational equality," which
would be compromised by the qualitative and quantitative reductions in
instruction that a truncated school year would entail."'
Furthermore, the Butt court dismissed arguments that policy
considerations of local control should absolve the State of ultimate
responsibility for individual school districts."' Citing more than one
hundred years of precedent,"' the court noted that "plenary" power over
education has always vested in the State, rather than local school
districts. 254 The Butt court also pointed to "the pervasive role the State
itself has chosen to assume in order to ensure a fair, high quality public
education for all California students.""' One scholar noted that "[t]he
court strained to avoid casting the issue in adequacy terms,'~'•
notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs had not framed their
complaint in those terms. Thus, the California Supreme Court has
already come precipitously close to interpreting adequacy into the state
constitution, arguably awaiting only the appropriate challenge.
In interpreting constitutional education clauses, courts have relied on a
number of indicators, including the plain meaning of the language,
historical analysis of constitutional framers' intent, and other states'
interpretations of similar language."' The specific provision of the
California Constitution that gives rise to an adequacy claim states, "A
general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the
preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall
the basic right to education afforded other California students. See id. at 1243-44.
248. Id. at 1249.
249. Id. at 1253.
250. See id. at 1264. The court indicated that a constitutional violation would occur
when the actual quality of a district's program falls fundamentally below prevailing
statewide standards. See id. at 1252. Evidence presented at trial convinced the court that
a significant reduction in educational quality would result from a shortened school year.
See id. at 1252-53.
251. Id. at 1253.
252. See id. at 1247-56.
253. See id. at 1249-51.
254. Id. at 1254.
255. Id.
256. Enrich, supra note 196, at 114.
257. See Thro, supra note 197, at 25.
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encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific,
moral, and agricultural improvement.""' This clause is one of the
strongest in the nation, containing both a "purposive preamble"2' 9 and a
"stronger and more specific educational mandate."260 Noted education
scholar William E. Thro asserts that courts should look to the plain
meaning of such strong clauses, which reflect a deep public commitment
261
to education.
"Essential"262 describes the fundamental interest
California places in education, while "suitable" can clearly be
26
interpreted as adequate. ' The purpose for which education must be
suitable or adequate is found in the phrase "preservation of the rights and
liberties of the people."264 This phrase indicates that California's interest
in education is more than merely academic-it reflects the need for the
populace to be educated in order to participate in a democratic society.
Other state court interpretations of the education clauses in their
constitutions provide ample persuasive authority upon which to base
interpreting an adequacy requirement into the California Constitution.
As discussed above, more than a dozen state supreme courts have
construed their state constitution education clause to require adequacy. 265
Their analyses have considered the intentions of constitutional framers,
historical commitment to education, and other typical tools for

258. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § I.
259. Thro, supra note 197, at 24 (quoting Erica Grubb, Breaking the Language
Barrier: The Right to Bilingual Education, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 52, 68 (1974)).
260. Id. (quoting Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools:
Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 Tux. L. REv. 777, 815 (1985)). Thro adopts
Ratner' s classification of state education clauses, dividing them into four categories. See
id. at 22-25. Category I clauses are the weakest, merely mandating free public schools,
while category IV clauses are described as the strongest, expressly making education an
important duty of the State. See id. at 23-25. California's education clause falls into
category III, which is the second strongest. See id. at 24 & n.31. Together, categories III
and IV consist of education clauses from a total of 10 states. Id. at 24-25.
261. See id. at 28-31 (arguing that such an analysis most closely approaches
framers' intent as to the magnitude of a state's duty to educate).
262. The dictionary definition of "essential" includes: "of the utmost importance:
basic, indispensable, necessary." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 425
(I 986) (emphasis omitted).
263. The definition of "adequate" includes "suitable to the case or occasion."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 39 (6th ed. 1990).
264. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § I.
265. See cases cited supra note 202 and discussion supra Part III.C; see also Enrich,
supra note 196, app. at 185-94 (summarizing 51 cases on a state-by-state basis); Jensen,
supra note 180, app. at 44-47 (tabulating the results of adequacy and equality decisions
in 61 cases).
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266

constitutional constmction.
Similar analyses were used in suf.port of
constitutional protection for education in Butt and Serrano. 67 But
scholars further suggest that state court decisions are based largely on
the inherent value of education and the intuitive appeal of a quality
standard. 268 Some go so far as to suggest that courts want to hear
adequacy-based arguments and will craft supporting decisions on any
available facts. 269
Finally, law professor and education reformer Peter Enrich suggests
that the contemporary political context significantly influences a state
court's interpretation of the education clause in that state's
constitution."0 Specifically, at the same time that state courts in
Washington, Kentucky, and Massachusetts were reading quality
requirements into their respective state constitutions, the legislatures in
these states were in the process of reforming education."' Thus, the
judicial decisions in these states can be "understood as gart of a broader
political effort pointing in the same general direction." 72 According to
Enrich, the issue of competency was obviated by courts acting in their
capacity "not to displace the legislative function . . . but rather to serve
as a goad or as a backstop to the [L]egislature's accomplishment of that
task." 273
In California, the quality of education is at the forefront of political
issues for 2000. Newly-elected Governor Gray Davis ran on a platform
of educational reform. 274 Davis's plans focus on key components of
266. SeeRosev.CouncilforBetterEduc.,Inc., 790S.W.2d 186,205-11 (Ky.1989)
(considering constitutional framers' intent, Kentucky legal precedent, and education
clause analysis of the West Virginia Supreme Court); McDuffy v. Secretary of the
Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 523-48 (Mass. 1993) (including an extensive
review of Massachusetts' history dating back to the 1600s); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v.
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 148-52 (Tenn. 1993) (extensively comparing similar cases
in other states and reviewing constitutional debates); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859,
865-69 (W. Va. 1979) (comparing the West Virginia constitutional debates with those in
other states that have adopted similar education clause language).
267. See Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1247-56 (Cal. 1992) (extensively reviewing
California education precedent); Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976),
cert. denied. 432 U.S. 907, 949-51 (1977); Serrano v. Priest (Serrano/), 487 P.2d 1241,
1248-49 (Cal. 1971 ).
268. See Jensen, supra note 180, at 21-42. Jensen suggests that "[i]n effect, the
courts are taking judicial notice of the prominent value of education and using the mere
existence of the education clause to advance education." Id. at 42.
269. See Jensen, supra note 180, at 21-26 (giving examples of cases in which courts
have explicitly stated that they are looking for arguments based on the qualitative
language of constitutional education clauses).
270. See Enrich, supra note 196, at 175-79.
271. See id.
272. Id. at 176.
273. Id. (footnotes omitted).
274. See. e.g., Nick Anderson, Davis Promises Fast Starts on Sweeping Education
Agenda, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at SI; see also John Jacobs, Davis Invests Heavy
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quality education including literacy, basic skills, and the accountability
of schools for better results."' To address these issues, he called a
special session of the legislature dedicated to education. 276 Furthermore,
California citizens consider education a top priority and expect
significant improvement. 277
Nevertheless, during his first year in office, Governor Davis has been
criticized as "painstakingly ... middle-of-the-road,""' paralyzed by fear
of the "tax and spend label. "279 Although his education initiatives have
pushed forward bold change on the accountability front, Davis's refusal
to increase education spending has led to calls for a statewide ballot
initiative aimed at raising California's level of education support to the
national average, including a proposal from the politically powerful
California Teachers Association (CTA). 28° Fiscal and political concerns
also appear to be behind the Governor's October 1999 vetoes of six
special education bills sent to his desk by the Legislature. 281 These bills
Political Capital in Education, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 14, 1999, at B7 (concluding that
"fixing education will be the one standard by which [Davis's] first term [as Governor] is
measured").
275. See Anderson, supra note 274, at SI; Editorial, The Education Agenda,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Jan. 14, 1998, at BS.
276. See, e.g., The Education Agenda, supra note 275, at BS.
277. See Jacobs, supra note 274, at B7; see also Nanette Asimov, Education
Challenge for Davis, Eastin, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 5, 1998, at Al9 (noting that voters
rejected former Governor Pete Wilson's brand of education reform in favor of
Democratic initiatives for change).
278. Editorial, Hope fora Bolder 2000, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1999, at BS.
279. Robert C. Fellmeth, Opinion, What We're Not Getting from "The Education
Governor," SAN DIEGO UNJON-TRIB., July 29, 1999, at Bl3.
280. See Amy Pyle, State Teachers Union Faces Calls for Change, L.A. nMES, Jan.
7, 2000, at Al (noting that at the CTA's annual summer conference, the "mere mention
of Davis or his reforms drew boos"); see also Amy Pyle, State School Spending Gap
Debate Grows, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2000, at Al (citing opinion polls that show
Californians overwhelmingly support "reaching for the national average in education
spending and a majority want to go even further," while Davis appears to have avoided
the issue during his recent State of the State speech).
281. See Governor's Veto of A.B. 395, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
Oct. 9, I 999), available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information
(visited Jan. 15, 2000) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_035 I-0400/
ab_395_vt_l9991009.html>; Governor's Veto of A.B. 645, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. Oct. 10, I 999), available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information
(visited Jan. 15, 2000) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_0601-0650/
ab_645_vt_l999!010.html>; Governor's Veto of A.B. 953, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. Oct. 10, 1999), available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information
(visited Jan. 15, 2000) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_095 l-lOOO/
ab_953_vt_l9991010.html>; Governor's Veto of A.B. 1020, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. Oct. 10, I 999), available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information
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would have, among other things, permitted foster parents to participate
in the IEPs of their foster children,"' required evaluations of the special
educational needs of children placed in protective custody," and
brought California law into conformity with the federal requirements of
the IDEA 97. 284 In the face of overwhelming support for the vetoed
legislation,"' a "no" vote by the "Education Governor" can only be taken
as a sign of unwillingness to take the steps necessary for real and lasting
reform."6 Thus, the political climate in California appears ripe for
(visited Jan. 15, 2000) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_1001-1050/
ab_l020_vt_l9991010.html>; Governor's Veto of S.B. 156, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. Oct. 10, 1999), available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information
(visited Jan. 15, 2000) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_O 151-0200/
sb_l56_vt_l9991010.html>; Governor's Veto of S.B. 867, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. Oct. 10, 1999), available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information
(visited Jan. 15, 2000) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_0851-0900/
sb_867_ vt_l9991010.html>.
282. See A.B. 1020, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (Corbett, as amended
Sept. 3, 1999), available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information
(visited Jan. 15, 2000) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_l 001-1050/
ab_l020_bill_19990910_enrolled. html>. This bill was vetoed over fears that it would
"drive up the number of referrals [for special education] at taxpayers' expense."
Governor's Veto of A.B. 1020, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Oct. 10, 1999),
available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information (visited Jan. 15, 2000)
<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_l 001-1050/ab_l 020_vt_l 999101 0.html>.
However, Governor Davis's interpretation of state obligations are misguided as this bill
would only reach children the state is already obligated to provide special education to,
but who are currently falling through the cracks. If costs would increase, they are only
those already owed.
283. See A.B. 645, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (Honda, as amended
Sept. 3, 1999), available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information
(visited Jan. I 5, 2000) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_060!-0650/
ab_645_bill_l 9990909_enrolled. html>.
284. See A.B. 395, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (Dutra, as amended
Sept. 3, 1999), available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information
(visited Jan. 15, 2000) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_0351-0400/
ab_395_bill_19990910_enrolled. html>; S.B. 156, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
1999) (Figueroa, as amended Sept. 3, 1999), available at California Legislative Counsel,
Bill Information (visited Jan. 15, 2000) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/
sb_0l51-0200/sb _156_bill_l9990907_enrolled. html>.
285. Assembly Bill 1020, for example, passed unanimously through both
Committee and Floor votes and found widespread support from such organizations as the
Juvenile Court Judges of California and the County Welfare Directors Association. See
SENATE RULES COMM., ANALYSIS OF CAL. A.B. 1020, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
1999) (prepared for Sept. 7, 1999 Senate floor vote), available at California Legislative
Counsel, Bill Information (visited Jan. 15, 2000) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/
asm/ab_l 001-1050/ab_l 020_cfa_l50627_sen_floor.html>.
286. The Governor's veto messages indicate his unwillingness to impose
reimbursable local mandates, no matter how small, or to exceed the requirements of
federal law by an even insignificant degree. See supra note 281. His actions were likely
influenced by pending negotiations between the State and local school districts over $1.9
billion in reimbursable special education costs. See Amy Pyle, Davis Asked to Help End
Special Education Funding Dispute, L.A. TIMES, Nov. I, 1999, at A3. In 1992, an
appeals court found the State liable for the costs it imposed on local schools to provide
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judicial prodding in the form of a decision interpreting an adequacy
requirement into the state constitution.
Taken together, these factors suggest that a court challenge would
likely result in the California Supreme Court holding that a minimum
level of educational quality is guaranteed by the state constitution.
Clearly, the political climate is favorable for change in education. Thus,
one would hope that legislative and administrative actions would make
litigation unnecessary. Yet, regardless of the means for accomplishing
change, the question that must next be addressed is whether change is
required: Is California's current system of education constitutionally
adequate?

V. Is EDUCATION IN CALIFORNIA'S SCHOOLS ADEQUATE?
This section explores the adequacy of California's education system
by applying a hypothetical constitutional standard. This Comment does
not assert that a constitutional challenge should be initiated in the
California courts.
Indeed, a lengthy court battle would be
counterproductive by draining resources from the pursuit of educational
objectives. However, this Comment does propose that the State look to
the duty imposed by the California Constitution in making legislative
and policy decisions, rather than relying solely on optional federal
initiatives, such as the IDEA.
Inasmuch as state constitutional questions are addressed by the
California Supreme Court, it is appropriate to examine educational
adequacy from the perspective that the court might take. This section
examines similar analyses performed by the high courts of other states in
predicting the content and context of educational requirements that the
California high court might impose on state schools. California schools
are then examined to see whether they would pass such a test.
Special education is at once part of the larger system of education in
California and separate from, or parallel to, general education. Disabled
students are, first and foremost, students-who are entitled to the same
constitutional protections as non-disabled students. If the entire system
of education is inadequate, then special education will be found lacking.
However, specific programs for disabled students may be deficient even
services in excess of those required by federal law. See id. The Commission on State
Mandates, charged with deciding how the money would be repaid, has asked the
Governor to negotiate a settlement to this nearly twenty year legal battle. See id.
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if general education is sufficient for the maJonty of non-disabled
students. Such a system could be attacked as failing on both adequacy
and equal protection grounds. Thus, this section looks at both the
overall quality of California's education system and the specific quality
of education provided handicapped students.
Cases involving claims of constitutionally inadequate public schools
have focused on three areas of inquiry: the definition of adequacy,
including goals and standards; the resources available for the pursuit of
these goals; and the outcome of the educational process as measured by
achievement. Of these three, outcomes have proven most dispositive for
a determination of constitutional adequacy. Nevertheless, outcomes
depend on standards against which they can be measured, and the
provision of sufficient resources to achieve them. In this section, each of
these areas will be analyzed independently.
A. Goals and Standards

1. The Test

State courts emphasize the constitutional duty of their respective
legislatures to define the boundaries of adequate education."' Adequacy
implies sufficiency for a particular purpose, and that purpose must be
clearly articulated."' Courts recognize their limited competence and
lack of expertise in this arena."" Thus, courts frequently define adequate
education in broad terms and charge their respective legislatures with
providing details. 2
In Leandro v. State, 291 for example, the North Carolina Supreme Court
ruled that the minimum standard of quality guaranteed by the North
<)()

287. See, e.g., McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d
516,555 (Mass. 1993) (leaving "it to the ... [l]egislatures to define the precise nature of
the task which they face in fulfilling their constitutional duty to educate our children");
see also Enrich, supra note 196, at 176-79 (comparing the duty courts have placed on
legislatures in Kentucky, Washington, and Massachusetts to set standards for education).
288. See Enrich, supra note 196, at 176-78.
289. See id. at 171-78.
290. See, e.g., Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 140, 156
(Tenn. 1993) (holding that the Legislature had the prerogative to establish the means for
effecting quality education, which was its duty to provide); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v.
State, 585 P.2d 71, 95 (Wash. 1978) (obligating the Legislature to "give specific
substantive content to ... the program it deems necessary to provide that 'education'
within the broad guidelines" established by the court); see also William F. Dietz, Note,
Manageable Adequacy Standards in Education Reform litigation, 74 WASH. U. L.Q.
1193, 1203-22 (1996) (discussing courts' various approaches to defining adequacy,
including the deferential approach of using existing state education standards).
291. 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997).
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Carolina Constitution was a "sound basic education."292 At a minimum,
"sound basic education" provides students:
(I) sufficient ability to read, write, and speak the English language and a

sufficient knowledge of fundamental mathematics and physical science to
enable the student to function in a complex and rapidly changing society; (2)
sufficient fundamental knowledge of geography, history, and basic economic
and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices with
regard to issues that affect the student personally or affect the student's
community, state, and nation; (3) sufficient academic and vocational skills to
enable the student to successfully engage in post-secondary education or
vocational training; and (4) sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable
the student to compete on an equal basis with others in further formal education
or gainful employment in contemporary society. 293

In remanding the case for further factual determinations, the Leandro
court instructed that the lower court could consider whether the goals
and standards adopted by the Legislature were consistent with providing
a "sound basic education. " 294
Courts in a number of other states have enumerated similar qualities
against which education should be measured."' The Kentucky Supreme
Court, for example, defined nine characteristics of adequate schools and
enumerated seven areas such schools must develop. 296 Alabama schools
must similarly promote nine enumerated abilities."' Massachusetts
adopted Kentucky's list of seven capabilities,298 while New Jersey
deferred elaboration of such standards to the Legislature. 299
Thus, a key factor that courts look to when determining whether state
legislatures have fulfilled their constitutional duty to provide adequate
education is whether they have established goals and standards for
students. In the absence of such standards, courts may either impose
them, adapt them from other sources, or order the Legislature to adopt
them.
292. Id. at 254.
293. Id. at 255.
294. See id. at 259.
295. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 107-08 (Ala. 1993);
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212-13 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v.
Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94-95 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d
859, 877 (W. Va. 1979).
296. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
297. See Opinion of the Justices No. 338,624 So. 2d at 107-08.
298. See McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554.
299. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295-97 (N.J. 1973).
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2.

General Education Programs

California is currently in the process of adopting rigorous academic
standards for elementary and secondary education.
Legislation
introduced during the 1995-1996 term directed the California State
Board of Education (State Board) to adopt content and performance
standards in core curriculum areas.""' Previous California law governing
curriculum and assessment, including the controversial California
Learning Assessment System, sunsetted in 1995.'°' As of January 2000,
content standards in various disciplines had been adopted by the State
Board302 and performance standards were in preparation.'0' The State of
California cannot, therefore, assert that it has currently fulfilled its
obligation to articulate standards as part of a state constitutional duty to
provide adequate education. Nevertheless, the significant progress in
this direction would likely bode favorably on the State in any court
challenge.
3.

Special Education Programs

The standards articulated by the State Board, however, may be
criticized for failure to address the needs of students with disabilities.
Official policy of the California Department of Education (CDE) holds
all students to these standards,'04 but evidence suggests that disabled
students were not contemplated when state standards were proposed or
adopted.'0'
Indeed, it appears that disabled students were only
300. See California Assessment of Academic Achievement Act, ch. 975, 1995 Cal.
Legis. Serv. 5764 (West) (A.B. 265, Alpert) (codified as amended at CAL EDUC. CODE
§§ 60600-60800 (West 1998)).
301. See MARK SEKTNAN, ANALYSIS OF CAL. A.B. 265, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 1999), at 6-7, available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information,
(visited Jan. 15, 2000) <http://www.leginfor.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/asm/ab_0251-0300/
ab_265_ cfa_950915_115926_asm_floor.html> (prepared for Sept. 15, 1995 Assembly
floor concurrence vote on Senate amendments).
302. See STANDARDS, CURRICULUM, AND ASSESSMENT DIV., CALIFORNIA DEPT.
EDUC. STANDARDS AND ASSESSMENT UPDATE 1 (1998).
303. See id. at 35-37; see also Curriculum & Instructional Leadership Branch,
California Dep't Educ., Curriculum Development and Supplemental Materials Comm'n
(last modified Jan. IO, 2000) <http://www.cde.ca.gov/cilbranch/eltdiv/cdsmc.htm>
(linking to timelines for completion and adoption of standards in such areas as science,
history-social science, and foreign language).
304. See CALIFORNIA STATE Bo. Eouc., COMPREHENSIVE VISION, MISSION, AND
GOALS STATEMENT (1998).
305. See CALIFORNIA DEP'T EDUC., SPECIAL EDUC. DEP'T, IMPROVING SPECIAL
EDUC. THROUGH COMPLIANCE: FINAL REP. OF THE A.B. 602 WORKGROUP TO THE LEGIS.
AND Gov. (1999) [hereinafter A.B. 602 REPORT]. The recommendations of the
Committee to the Legislature for resolving unmet state needs include:
The superintendent shall develop and the State Board shall adopt goals
and standards for the performance of individuals with exceptional needs that
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considered in assessment and curriculum plans subsequent to the federal
requirements of the IDEA 97.'06 Further evidence suggests that
California continues to exclude students with disabilities in the
development of statewide curriculum, standards, and assessments. 307
One expert asserts that academic standards should at least contemplate
three categories of students: 1) those who are capable of meeting
academic standards given the general education curriculum; 2) those
who can meet standards with special instruction and services (i.e.,
special education); and 3) those who are not capable of meeting
academic standards.'0'
Some argue that such a framework is
insufficiently broad if failure is expected from identifiable groups of
students, while others view high standards merello as goals that need not
be achieved by the entire population to be valid. 09 Yet, most agree that
are consistent with goals and standards for all pupils in the public education
system.
The superintendent shall develop and the State Board shall adopt content
standards developed by the Commission Establishing Academic and
Performance Standards and performance indicators that will be used to assess
progress toward achieving established goals.
Id. at 28. These recommendations suggest that, in the A.B. 602 Workgroup's view,
existing standards are neither applicable to, nor appropriate for, disabled students. See
also id. at app. 5 (proposing statutory language to establish standards and goals for
exceptional students); CALIFORNIA DEP'T EDUC., SPECIAL EDUC. DN., STATE OF CAL.
IMPROVEMENT PLAN 20-25 (1998) [hereinafter STATE IMPROVEMENT PLAN] (detailing the
need to form a special committee to address the requirements of the IDEA 97
amendments, including academic standards and education reform coordination for
students with disabilities).
306. See A.B. 602 REPORT, supra note 305, at 25-29. In 1997, two years after the
enactment of Assembly Bill 265 directing the State Board of Education to adopt content
and performance standards, see supra text accompanying notes 300-01, the Advisory
Commission on Special Education recommended that statutory changes would be needed
in California to conform state law to the IDEA 97 mandates regarding standards and
assessments as applied to disabled students. See A.B. 602 REPORT, supra note 305, at
25-29. This analysis suggests that neither the Legislature that enacted Assembly Bill 265
nor the State Board of Education implementing the statute had contemplated that
statewide standards would apply to disabled students.
307. See CALIFORNIA DEP'T EDUC., SPECIAL EDUC. DEP'T, CALIFORNIA ADVISORY
COMM'N ON SPECIAL EDUC. ANNUAL REP. 1997-98, at 17-19 (Patricia Winget & Elissa
Provance eds., 1998) [hereinafter CACSE REPORT] (recommending that in the future, the
California Department of Education actively include the concerns of special needs
children in the development of statewide curriculum, standards, and assessment tests).
308. See Alex J. Hurder, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and the
Right to Learn, HUM. RTS., Winter 1997, at 16, 16.
309. See JUDITH L. ELLIOTT & MARTHA L. THURLOW, OPENING THE DOOR TO
EDUCATIONAL REFORM: UNDERSTANDING STANDARDS 10-17 (Nat'! Ctr. on Educ.
Outcomes, Univ. of Minn., Minneapolis, Minn., 1997), microformed on ERIC, Fiche ED
412 719 (ERIC Document Reprod. Serv., Computer Microfilm Int'l Corp.) [hereinafter
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appropriate policy guidance is required for interpretation and that all
stakeholders should be included during planning, adoption, and
implementation of an accountability system. 310 To the extent that
guidance is unavailable, confusion will remain as to what level of
achievement is expected of students with disabilities. For example,
Vanderbilt Law School Professor Alex J. Hurder asserts that high
academic standards are inconsistent with the Rowley "some benefit"
11
standard.' Instead, he argues that high standards require schools to
provide any and all related services that are necessary for children who
lack the potential to pass the regular curriculum to reach his or her own
maximum individual potential.' 12
Thus, although California has recently made progress in defining
educational expectations, it lacks academic standards that were
thoughtfully designed and can be meaningfully applied to all students,
including those with disabilities. Therefore, California's system of
education is not constitutionally adequate for special education students
and the Legislature has not fulfilled its constitutional duty to them.
B.
1.

Resources
The Test

In determining whether students receive adequate education, courts
also look to the availability of resources for pursuing educational goals.

ELLIOTT & THURLOW, STANDARDS].
310. See, e.g., Martha Thurlow et al., Questions and Answers: Tough Questions
About Accountability Systems and Students with Disabilities, SYNTHESIS REP. 24 (Nat'l
Ctr. on Educ. Outcomes, Univ. of Minn., Minneapolis, Minn.), Sept. 1996, at 17,
micro/armed on ERIC, Fiche ED 404 802 (ERIC Document Reprod. Serv., Computer
Microfilm Int'! Corp.). See generally ELLIOTT & THURLOW, STANDARDS, supra note 309
(detailing issues that policy guidance on standards must address for students with
disabilities); KATHERINE FRASER, WHAT WILL IT TAKE?: STANDARDS-BASED EDUCATION
REFORM FOR ALL STUDENTS (Ctr. for Policy Research on the Impact of Gen. & Special
Educ. Reform, Alexandria, Va., 1996), micro/armed on ERIC, Fiche ED 401 695 (ERIC
Document Reprod. Serv., Computer Microfilm Int'! Corp.) (discussing the implications
of standards for students with disabilities in the broader context of general education
reform).
3 I I. See Hurder, supra note 308, at 17.
312. According to Hurder:
A child with a disability who has the potential to graduate from the
regular education program should have a right to an IEP with the goal of
graduating ....
A child who does not have the potential ... should have a right to an IEP
with the goal of reaching his or her maximum educational potential. No other
goal would be rational.

Id.
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Included in this inquiry are such input provisions as: per pupil
expenditures; state and local facilities and durable equiriment; textbooks
and curriculum; and qualified educational personnel. 13 In Rose, the
Kentucky Supreme Court found a "definite correlation between the
money spent per child on education and the quality of the education
received."314 The Rose court held that Kentucky schools, which then
ranked fortieth nationally in per pupil expenditures, were underfunded
315
and inadequate.
Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court viewed
crowded classes, neglected libraries, the inability to attract and retain
high quality teachers, and the lack of teacher training as indicators of
. dequacy. ,1•
ma
The consolidated cases of Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, Inc.
1
and Harper v. Hunt'1 are unique in that the court was asked to evaluate
the educational mandate both for children in general and for disabled
children in particular.318 The court "emphasize[d] that schoolchildren
with disabilities have the same constitutional right to an equitable and
adequate education as all other schoolchildren."' 19 Furthermore, the
court recognized that strict per pupil spending allowances were not an
adequate means of providing for disabled and disadvantaged students
whose needs differ from those of the general education population. 320
Thus, the court overturned the State's total enrollment method321 of
funding special education because it did "not take into account the
313. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices No. 338,624 So. 2d 107, 128-36 (Ala. 1993);
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 196-99 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v.
Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 553 (Mass. 1993); Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. Iv. State, 585 P.2d 71, 98 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859,
862 n.4, 877 (W. Va. 1979).
314. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 198.
315. See id. at 197.
316. See McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 553.
317. See Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV91-0117 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Montgomery County filed Apr. I, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of
the Justices No. 338,624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993) [hereinafter Opinion of the Justices No.
338]. The opinion of the lower court was published as an appendix to the Alabama
Supreme Court Opinion. See id. at 110-67. The Alabama high court held that the
Legislature was constitutionally required to comply with the lower court order. See id. at
107.
318. See id. at 112.
319. Id. at 162.
320. See id. at 125-26.
321. The total enrollment method bases state funding for special education on total
pupil counts in a school district, regardless of the percentage of students with special
needs or the nature and severity of their disabilities. See id. at 125.
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number or the cost of educating those children, " 322 and failed to provide
sufficient staffing, monitoring, or special education teacher training. 323
Thus, an adequate state system for education must have sufficient
facilities and provisions for students to learn, achieve, and eventually
participate in society. Both general and special education programs
must be funded at a level sufficient to achieve these goals for the public
school system to pass state constitutional muster.
2.

General Education Programs

In terms of the resources allocated for education, California schools
paint a dismal picture. In a recent report, California ranked dead last
among states for adequacy of expenditures, spending only $4789 per
pupil in 1997. 324 California received similarly low marks for other
indicators such as the number of students per available computer,
teacher salaries, and school buildings in disrepair."' U.S. Department of
Education statistics indicate that California had the second highest ratio
of students to teachers in elementary and secondary schools among
states from 1990 to 1994, and the highest ratio in 1995.326 During 1998,
school districts across the state were forced to raise funds by referendum
to repair deteriorating facilities. 327 San Diego Unified School District,
for example, requested local taxpayers approve a $ 1.51 billion bond
measure to fix leaky roofs, crumbling walls, hazardous lead pipes, and
faulty wiring in the state's second largest school district."' Clearly, the
322. Id.
323. See id. at 126.
324. See Craig D. Jerald et al., Quality Counts '99: The State of the States, Eouc.
WK .. Jan. 11, 1999, at 106, 120. California expenditures were more than $1100 less per
pupil than the national average and almost half that of the highest spending state, New
Jersey, with an average expenditure of $8436 per pupil (note that these figures are
adjusted for regional cost differences). See id. In 1996, California spent only $30.78 per
$1000 in state wealth (gross state product). See id. at 121. Only six other states spent
less. See id.
325. See id. at 121. In 1998, California tied for the second highest number of
students per multimedia computer. See id. Only two states in 1994 reported a greater
percentage of schools in inadequate condition. See id. In 1997, California teachers'
salaries were nearly $1200 less than the national average. See id.
326. See National Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Educ., Digest of Education
Statistics 1997, at tbl.66 (visited Aug. 23, 1999) <http://nces.ed.gov/pubs/digest97/
d97t066.html>.
327. See Jack Leonard, L.A. County Elections; 5 of 7 School Bond Measures Pass,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at B3 (reporting that statewide, more than half the local
school bond measures received the necessary two-thirds vote to pass and the $9.2 billion
state measure was approved by a landslide); Jack Leonard, School Bond Measures: 7
Districts Seek Funds; in Many, Backers Alter Tactics, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1998, at B6;
Editorial, Vote Yes on School Bonds, S.F. CHR0N., Oct. 4, 1998, at 6.
328. See School Bond Issues, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 12, 1998, General
Election Voter's Guide (Special Section), at A22; see also Maureen Magee, Repairs to

262

Adequate Special Education

[VOL. 37: 211, 2000]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

resources available to general education programs in California are
insufficient to provide adequate education to the children of the state.
3.

Special Education Programs

The picture for special education students in California is equally
bleak. The Education Finance Statistics Center of the U.S. Department
of Education reports that there are no recent, comprehensive, and
accurate data for public school expenditures on special education."'
Voluntary, informal reporting of 1993-1994 expenditures revealed that
California spent close to the median amount (in actual dollars) of
twenty-four participating states."0 Yet these expenditures have been
insufficient to provide such essential components of special education
instruction as adequate staffing-according to CDE statistics, the state
faces a critical shortage of qualified special education teachers. 331
The method of funding special education in California is also suspect.
In 1997, the state revised the method by which it reimburses local
education agencies, called SELPAs,33 ' for the costs of special
education. 333 Assembly Bill 602 changed the funding formula from one
San Diego Schools Launched, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 5, 1998, at Bl (reporting
on the passage of the San Diego bond measure and the repairs that will be completed
with the additional funds).
329. See Education Finance Statistics Ctr., U.S. Dept. of Educ., Answers to
Frequently Asked Questions: Special Education (last modified Oct. 19, 1998)
<http://nces.ed.gov/edfin/faqs/speced.html> (citing T. PARRISH ET AL., STATE SPECIAL
EDUCATION FINANCE SYSTEMS 1994-95 (Ctr. for Special Educ. Fin., Am. lnsts. for
Research, John C. Flanagan Research Ctr., Palo Alto, Cal., 1997)).
330. See id. at tbl.l. The figure of $5580 was reported with only marginal
confidence and may overestimate relative expenditures because data were not adjusted
for regional cost variations. See id.
331. See STATE IMPROVEMENT PLAN, supra note 305, at 8-12. During the 19961997 school year, there was an unmet demand for more than 6000 additional special
education teachers in California. See id. at 9. Nearly a third of all special education
teachers were not fully qualified, relying instead on emergency permits and waivers. See
id.
332. SELPAs are Special Education Local Plan Areas. See CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 56195.l(d) (West 1998). Large school districts of "sufficient size and scope" are
coextensive with their corresponding SELPAs. Id. § 56195.l(a). Smaller school
districts are required to consolidate their programs under a joint local plan to provide
special education services. See id. § 56195.l(b). Thus, the smaller school districts in a
geographic area are consolidated as a SELPA to jointly provide services to their
collective students. See id.
333. See Poochigian and Davis Special Education Reform Act. ch. 854, 1997 Cal.
Legis. Serv. 4789 (West) (A.B. 602) (codified at scattered sections of Cal. Educ. Code
(West 1998)).
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334

based on personnel costs to one based on total pupil counts. Although
the current system is designed to provide more equitable reimbursement
throughout the state, it is still a capitated system that funds only a
percentage of the costs of services, rather than the actual cost of special
education or the added cost for disabled students' education relative to
non-disabled students."' According to the Center for Special Education
336
Finance (CSEF), state funding must reflect the real costs of providing
special education and related services in order to pass state constitutional
muster."' Thus, the current system in California, which is based on
neither the actual number of special education students in a SELPA nor
the actual costs of providing services to those students, is an
inappropriate and inadequate method for funding special education
338
under CSEF's analysis.
334. See id. at 4789-90. Total pupil counts include a census of all students, not just
students with disabilities. See id. at 4 790. Thus, under Assembly Bill 602, SELPAs will
be reimbursed for funding special education as a function of the number of students
served in all education programs rather than the number served in special education. See
id. at 4790-91. Such a funding formula, which arbitrarily detennines that only a
specified percentage of students will be funded for special education regardless of the
actual percentage identified, can provide a disincentive to identifying students who
genuinely need services if the total number of students in need exceeds state limits. See
Thomas B. Parrish & Jay G. Chambers, Financing Special Education, FUTIJRE
CHILDREN, Spring 1996, at 121, 132. The California special education funding system is
substantially similar to the total enrollment funding method found unconstitutional in
Alabama. See supra notes 317-23 and accompanying text. See generally FRASER, supra
note 310, at 24 (detailing the five most common formulas states use for special education
reimbursements to school districts).
335. The Legislature found that the disparity between school districts in funding
special education was as high as five-fold under the existing personnel-based system.
See Poochigian and Davis Special Education Reform Act, ch. 854, 1997 Cal. Legis.
Serv. at 4792. The existing system also was found to under-fund special education and
provided inappropriate fiscal incentives for special education placements. See id.
However, critics of the new funding system say it makes denying services to save money
more attractive to school administrators. See Gittelsohn & Kelleher, supra note 63, at
Al. One parent called schools "the HMOs of education" under the revised state
financing plan. Id.
336. CSEF is one of three national research centers funded by the Office of Special
Education Programs in the U.S. Department of Education to conduct and disseminate the
results of policy, resource, and cost analyses in special education at the federal and state
levels. For more information about CSEF, see Center for Special Educ. Fin., About
CSEF (last modified Oct. 15, 1999) <http://csef.air.org/about.html/>.
337. See Deborah A. Verstegen, Landmark Court Decisions Challenge State
Special Education Funding, CSEF BRIEF No. 9, Feb. 1998, at 1, 1-4 (Ctr. for Special
Educ. Fin., Am. Insts. for Research, Palo Alto, Cal.) (reviewing recent state court
decisions in Alabama, Wyoming, and Ohio that affect special education funding).
Verstegen concludes that courts require special education financing systems to be
equitable in that they are uniform across a state, cost-based, and legitimately justifiable
as determined by research studies. See id. at 4.
338. For a comprehensive review of criteria that should be considered when
evaluating special education funding formulas, see Parrish & Chambers, supra note 334,
at 133-35. Parish & Chambers discuss the political and fiscal concerns as well as the
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Compliance issues underscore the inadequacy of special education
resources in California. 339 Although compliance is not necessarily
dispositive of state obligations under the constitution, non-compliance is
an indication that needs are not being met and services are not being
provided.
In 1995, the Office of Special Education Rehabilitation Services
(OSERS) of the U.S. Department of Education found California out of
compliance with six general areas of federal law. 340 The Corrective
Action Plan (CAP)"' developed by the state promised improvements in
the provision of services identified on IEPs, guaranteeing a continuum of
placement options necessary for LRE requirements, improved staff
training, and increased vigilance in identifying and remedying noncompliant school districts. 342 Yet in 1998, a legislative task force
reported that "[i]n recent years, three LEAs in California have
experienced systemic, persistent noncompliance that led to major federal
and state monitoring efforts or litigation.""' The report also concluded
legal requirements for special education funding. See id. The authors suggest that
special education funding mechanisms should be designed with fourteen goals in mind.
See id. at 134-35. These goals are: 1) understandability and avoidance of unnecessary
complexity; 2) equity of distribution between districts in a state; 3) adequacy of funds to
support services; 4) predictability; 5) flexibility in implementation of programs; 6)
identification neutrality; 7) reasonableness of reporting burden; 8) fiscal accountability;
9) link of funding to cost-based differences in providing services; 10) placement
neutrality; 11) cost-control such that growth is stabilized; 12) outcome accountability;
13) conceptual connection to general education funding; and 14) political acceptability to
minimize disruptive effects of implementation. See id.
339. Compliance, in the context of special education, refers to conformity with
federal and state laws and regulations governing the provision of education to disabled
students.
See generally BACK TO SCHOOL, supra note 10 (describing the
compliance/enforcement scheme under the IDEA). Generally, these consist of the
provisions of the IDEA and the regulations that implement the Act. See id. Under the
Rowley test, school districts that do not follow the procedures of the IDEA (i.e., are noncompliant) are not providing appropriate education to disabled children. See Board of
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982).
340. See STATE IMPROVEMENT PLAN, supra note 305, at 15-16. The areas of noncompliance were general supervision (i.e., state monitoring of local district compliance),
LRE, transition, FAPE, due process, procedural safeguards, and evaluation. See id. In
short, the State demonstrated deficiencies with the full spectrum of IDEA provisions.
See id.
341. A CAP is the vehicle by which a state ensures that it will come into
compliance with areas of federal special education law upon a finding of noncompliance. See generally BACK TO SCHOOL, supra note 10 (describing compliancemonitoring, complaint-handling, and enforcement functions of the federal government).
CAPs are also used by a state to ensure compliance of local school districts.
342. See STATE IMPROVEMENT PLAN, supra note 305, at 15-16.
343. A.B. 602 REPORT, supra note 305, at 49. LEAs are local education agencies,
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that California was ill-equipped to address such cases. 344 The San Diego
Unified School District, for example, remains out of compliance despite
repeated CAPs for nearly ten years and the implementation of a stateappointed special education monitor."' The Los An~les Unified School
District currently operates under a consent decree.
In a 1999 letter
accompanying the follow-up monitoring report on CDE, conducted by
the U.S. Department of Education's monitoring arm, the Office of
Special Education Programs (OSEP), Assistant Secretary of Education
Judith E. Heumann and OSEP Director Thomas Hehir detailed their
concerns:
Although the California Department of Education has made some progress
in correcting some of the deficiencies noted in those earlier monitoring
reviews, ... [OSEP] is deeply concerned about continuing noncompliance, most
notably the California Department of Education's continuing failure to exercise
its general supervisory responsibility over local school districts in the [s]tate,
including ensuring that local school districts correct identified deficiencies in a
timely manner. As a result of this failure ... serious deficiencies have been
allowed to exist for a number of years, impacting services for children with
disabilities .... [OSEP] has documented many of these continuing deficiencies
in its prior monitoring reports ... of 1988, I 992, and 1996. The June I 998
follow-up visit documented that many previously identified problems remain
uncorrected. 347

i.e., school districts. See id. at 7.
344. See id. at 37-45.
345. See Joe Cantalupe, Kids Denied Special Care, State Says, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., Feb. 14, 1999, at Bl; Joe Cantalupe, Slow Reform Pace Hobbles Special
Education, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 1, 1998, at Al; Joe Cantalupe, Special Ed
Reform Called Long Overdue, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 15, 1997, at Bl; Joe
Cantalupe, Special Education Program Troubled, Investigators Say, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., Mar. 12, 1997, at Al; Joe Cantalupe, Special Education Watchdog Quietly Dogs
School District, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 28, 1997, at Al; Joe Cantalupe, Special
Neglect: Problems Papered Over, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 25, 1997, at Al.
346. See Amy Pyle, Judge's OK Opens Door to Overhaul of Special Education,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1996, at B3 (reporting that the school district, which acknowledged
breaking federal and state special education laws and thereby violated the rights of
65,000 disabled children, moved to settle the case fearing a drawn-out legal battle similar
to that waged for 17 years in New York City); see also Mary Lou Aurelio, Special
Education, CITY NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 20, I 997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File (detailing specific provisions of the settlement); Dan Lee, IAUSD Board
Approves Consent Decree; Court Hearing Next, CITY NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 14, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (noting that the settlement calls for a
massive overhaul of L.A. special education programs to provide the requisite continuum
of program options).
347. Letter from Judith Heumann, Assistant Secretary, Office of Special Education
and Rehabilitative Services, United States Department of Education, and Thomas Hehir,
Director, Office of Special Education Programs, United States Department of Education,
to Delaine Eastin, Superintendent of Public Instruction, California State Department of
Education (Apr. 1999) (on file with author); see also OSEP MONITORING REPORT: 1998
FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 1-13, app.A-B
(1999) (attachment to Heuman and Hehir letter, on file with author) (detailing specific
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Parents statewide continue to report dissatisfaction with special
education provided to their children and complaints to CDE continue to
•
348
increase.
Overall, the resources provided to both general and special education
students in California are constitutionally inadequate because they are
insufficient to fund the facilities, staff, and programs necessary for
students to achieve academic success and become productive members
of society. Under the conditions present in California schools, it is
difficult to see how any student can be educated on par with national
expectations. Clearly, California must provide additional resources in
order to fulfill its constitutional mandate.
C.

Outcomes

1.

The Test

Perhaps the single most important factor that courts consider in
adequacy decisions is student achievement. The North Carolina
Supreme Court suggested that "'output' measurements may be more
reliable than measurements of 'input, "'349 inasmuch as "education that
does not serve the purpose of preparing students to participate and
compete in the society in which they live and work is devoid of
substance and is constitutionally inadequate.""0 According to William
Kent Packard, the court was particularly persuaded by plaintiff-parties'
argument that absent a right to adequate educational outcomes, "the
State could fulfill its constitutional duties by providing children with
mandatory, tuition-free access to 'warehouses' . . . where no real
learning occurred.""'
examples of continuing noncompliance in various school districts throughout the state,
including San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco Unified School Districts).
348. See A.B. 602 REPORT, supra note 305, at 49. During the past three years
alone, complaints to the COE have doubled. See id. An estimated 700 complaint were
expected for the 1998-1999 school year. See id.
349. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 260 (N.C. 1997) (quoting Molly McUsic,
The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 307, 332 (1991)).
350. Id. at 254.
351. William Kent Packard, Note, A Sound, Basic Education: North Carolina
Adopts an Adequacy Standard in Leandro v. State, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1502 (1998).
Packard also cites reports that Chief Justice Mitchell interrupted the defense attorney
during his oral testimony to ask: "Shouldn't there be something at the end of the bus
ride?" Id. at 1503 (quoting Steve Ford, A Sound, Basic Step Toward Better Schools,
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Student achievement on standardized tests has played a key role in
assessing outcomes."' But in lieu of or in addition to test results, courts
also look to independent indicators of student success including dropout
rates, college attendance, and preparation for the workforce."'
In short, students' outcomes are the definitive measure of adequate
education. Adequate education must prove sufficient to prepare students
for life as productive citizens. Comparisons of tests scores and other
indicators with expected norms provide the best means for determining
whether education has provided meaningful preparation for life.
2.

General Education Programs

California students' performance has been consistently low in recent
years compared to other states. In 1994, California ranked thirty-eighth
of thirty-nine states participating in a national test for fourth grade
reading ability. 354 1996 scores for both fourth grade and eighth grade
math ability were similarly poor."' Among other indicators, California
recent!,?" ranked forty-second among the states for highest school dropout
rates." In 1996, California ranked fifth nationally in its juvenile violent
crime index."'
These data indicate that outcomes for California students are well
below the national average. Even the state's own legislative analyst
acknowledges the "wide range evidence of poor student achievement.""'
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 27, 1997, at A28).
352. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 197 (Ky.
1989) (noting low scores of Kentucky students on the ACT scholastic achievement test);
Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 259-60; DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 762 (Ohio 1997)
(finding that in 1993, 17,000 Ohio high school seniors had not passed their ninth grade
proficiency exam, after at least six opportunities to do so).
353. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices No. 338, supra note 317, at 136-37 (stating
that Alabama ranked 49th in its ability to graduate students after 12 years of school; most
of those who then attended college required remedial courses); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 197
(noting that only 68.2% of Kentucky's ninth graders were reported to eventually
graduate high school).
354. See Jerald et al., supra note 324, at I I I. Only 18% of students were proficient
by the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) test and more than half
were reading below a basic level of competency. See id. NAEP is commonly known as
"the nation's report card." GRADING TIIE NATION'S REPORT CARD I (James w.
Pellegrino et al. eds., I 999).
355. See Jerald et al., supra note 324, at 110. Less than twenty percent of students
tested were proficient at math. See id. Fifty-four percent and forty-nine percent of
fourth and eight graders, respectively, were performing below a basic level of
competency. See id.
356. See ROBERT C. FELLMETH, CALIFORNIA CHILDREN'S BUDGET 1998-99, at 7-2
(1998).
357. See id. at9-7.
358. PAUL WARREN ET AL., OFFICE OF THE CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, A SPECIAL
SESSION GUIDE TO K-12 REFORM 16 (1999).
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Based on these results, students in California have not been provided
education that is adequate to meaningfully prepare them for life in
California or any other state.
3.

Special Education Programs

Data for the outcomes of special education students are far less
available for the simple reason that disabled students, both nationally
and in California, are overwhelmingly excluded from standardized
tests. 359 1998 was the first year that California included disabled students
in standardized testing."" Inclusion of disabled students was clearly an
afterthought, compelled by the IDEA 97 reforms. 36 ' California selected a
testing instrument, the Stanford 9 Achievement Test, which was not
designed for students with disabilities and has not been validated for
administration to students given "non-standard" accommodations. 362 As
a result, comparative test results have not been reported for special
education students. 363 Furthermore, at least ten percent of disabled
students are not able to participate in the Stanford 9 Achievement Test
--even when non-standard accommodations are used. 364
Longitudinal follow-up of special education students' postsecondary
education or employment status is not performed in Califomia. 365
However, data on high school graduation and dropout rates are available.
In 1997, only 20.7% of the total potential graduates with disabilities left
high school with either a diploma or certificate of differential

359. See RONALD N. ERICKSON & MARTI-IA THURLOW, STATE SPECIAL EDUCATION
OUTCOMES, 1997: A REPORT ON STATE ACTIVITIES DURING EDUCATION REFORM (Nat')
Ctr. on Educ. Outcomes, Univ. of Minn., Minneapolis, Minn., 1997), microformed on
ERIC, Fiche ED 415 626 (ERIC Document Reprod. Serv., Computer Microfilm Int'!
Corp.).
360. See STATE IMPROVEMENT PLAN, supra note 305, at 5.
361. See A.B. 602 REPORT, supra note 305, at 25-27.
362. See CACSE REPORT, supra note 307, at 18-19; STATE IMPROVEMENT PLAN,
supra note 305, at 5. Non-standard accommodations include Braille, revised test
formats, and flexible sche<luling. See CACSE REPORT, supra note 307, at 18. Most
students taking the Stanford 9 with non-standard accommodations were special
education students. See STATE IMPROVEMENT PLAN, supra note 305, at 5.
363. See CACSE REPORT, supra note 307, al 18-19; STATE IMPROVEMENT PLAN,
supra note 305, at 5.
364. See Memorandum from Dr. Alice D. Parker, Director, Special Education
Division, California Department of Education, to Special Education Local Plan Area
Directors et al. (Mar. 20, 1998) (on file with author).
365. See STATE IMPROVEMENT PLAN, supra note 305, at 6.
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proficiency.",. By comparison, 66.3% of general education students
367
graduated with a diploma during the same time.
The percentage of
1997 high school graduates who had been in special education was only
368
4.4% compared to more than 11 % of the total statewide enrollment.
Although these data reveal little about the comparative national
outcomes of California's special education students, it is clear that
regular education students do poorly in California and disabled students
do worse. Outcomes for neither group can be described as adequate.
In summary, the State of California fails in every aspect of its duty to
provide a minimum quantum of education to students in both general
and special education programs. The current system of schools can thus
be characterized as unconstitutional by virtue of its inadequacy. Parents
and students should demand that the Legislature fulfill its constitutional
obligation by making statutory changes necessary to remedy deficiencies
in standards, resources, and outcomes for all students.
VI. IMPROVING SPECIAL EDUCATION IN CALIFORNIA
This section suggests strategies that might be taken to improve the
quality of special education in California. It is not intended to be an
exhaustive survey. Rather, it is intended to highlight promising
approaches that have been or could be implemented in pursuit of high
quality special education.
The specific examples presented in subsection B are intended as
stand-alone suggestions that can be effectively applied in the absence of
more sweeping and comprehensive education reforms. Such provisions
should, nevertheless, be considered as only part of an overall effort to
improve educational quality in California. This section, therefore,
begins with a consideration of special education reform in the context of
system-wide changes in education.
A.

General Considerations

California is well-known for frequent change in education policy, with
369
dramatic shifts from one extreme to another.
Perceived deficiencies

366. See id. at 5. A certificate of differential proficiency indicates attainment of
goals and standards established by the child's IEP. See CACSE REPORT, supra note 307,
at 17-18.
367. See STATE IMPROVEMENT PLAN, supra note 305, at 5.
368. See id.
369. See David K. Cohen, Standards-Based School Reform: Policy, Practice, and
Peiformance, in HOLDING SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE: PERFORMANCE-BASED REFORM IN
EDUCATION 99, 104-05 (Helen F. Ladd ed., 1996) (describing several cycles of change,
failure, and more change in California education policy during the 1980s and 1990s).
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are addressed by legislative, regulatory, and/or policy swings that often
create as many problems as they solve. 37° For example, the 1988
decision to implement a whole-language reading approach, to the
exclusion of phonics-based instruction, is commonly viewed as the
cause of current widespread student failure. 371 It has taken California
nearly a decade to correct this mistake."'
Similar education disasters can only be avoided by cautious and
reasoned decision-making by the State Legislature and administration.
However, California must also recognize that policy implementation at
the local level can be a major obstacle to effective state actions. 373 Policy
can be "remade" at various levels of the California education
apparatus. 374 Policy that is too broad or unclear sets the stage for failure
through a frustrating cycle in which
legislation, regulations or court decisions are met at the local level by confusion,
resistance, or painfully slow and half-hearted compliance: judges, agencies, and
regulators eventually respond by tightening rules and toughening enforcement;
and local institutions ultimately 'comply' by adhering narrowly and
legalistically to the letter of the law, which has become by then exceedingly
intricate. 375

370. See id.; see also Richard Lee Colvin & Elaine Woo, No One Knows if Money
Is Well Spent, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 1998, at RI (highlighting some of the more than 40
different versions of education reform California has attempted during the past 20 years,
and concluding that the absence of any "real measures for accountability" has resulted in
low student achievement and uncertainty about the effectiveness of instruction); Duke
Helfand, California Ranks Second to Last in U.S. Reading Test, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5,
1999, at Al (noting California's troubling tendency to embrace fads and that "California
has flip-flopped from one assessment to another, leaving no consistent measure of
progress").
371. See Duke Helfand, Education Board Expected to OK Phonics Rules, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 1998, at Al (reporting that whole language, now widely blamed for the
dismal performance of California's elementary school students, "didn't work for large
numbers of California children"); Jennifer Kerr, Phonics In, Calculators Out in State
Classrooms, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 11, 1998, at Al (quoting California Board of Education
member Bill Lucia describing whole language as "a heinous experiment" to which "4
million kids have been subject").
372. See Jennifer Kerr, State Public Schools Going Back to Phonics, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Dec. 11, 1998, at A4, available in 1998 WL 21284146; see also Helfand,
supra note 370, at Al (quoting Governor Gray Davis on future education policy in
response to past failures as "[w]e must not fail an entire generation of children").
373. See F'uLCHER, supra note 2, at 3 (discussing the tendency for "gaps" to develop
between policy and practice as a major cause of policy failure).
374. Id. at 116 (emphasis omitted).
375. Id. (quoting P. Berman, From Compliance to Leaming: Implementing Legally
Induced Reform, in SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS: THE LEGALIZATION AND REGULATION OF
EDUCATION 46, 54 (D. L. Kirp and D. N. Jensen eds., 1986)).
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An additional impediment to effective reform can come from political
posturing during negotiations between various stakeholders."'
Resistance by teachers, for example, has impeded the development of
stiff accountability measures in Vermont where political bargaining has
played a key role in the complex negotiation of that state's education
reforms. 377
Kentucky, on the other hand, is one of the few states that has
successfully implemented tough accountability measures, including
explicit rewards and punishments for educators, based on student
outcomes. 378 In contrast to Vermont, Kentucky's reforms were the
product of a court order rather than political bargaining in the legislative
or administrative branch. 379
The effects of radical, non-cooperative strategy can also be seen in the
PARC case. 380 Attorneys for the plaintiffs viewed school officials as
unwilling to develop, fund, and provide appropriate education for
disabled students in Pennsylvania."'
Instead of negotiating, the
plaintiffs adopted a confrontational posture and prevailed in court,
effectively achieving their goals without conceding to school officials'
382
concerns. Thus, those opposed to special education reforms would be
well-advised to consider the risks of exerting excessive political
pressure: perceived opposition may provide the impetus for a lawsuit,
which ultimately can result in more dramatic, systemic reform than
political cooperation.
The reasoned approach to education reform will consider the broadest
possible scope of competing interests while advancing the primary goal
of improving outcomes for disabled students. A comprehensive
framework of considerations has been set forth by researchers from the

376. See Cohen, supra note 369, at 117-19.
377. See id. at 117.
378. See id.
379. See id. Researchers and reformers have, nevertheless, expressed concerns
about whether Kentucky's reforms will be sustained over time. See Jacob E. Adams, Jr.,
School Finance Policy and Students' Opportunities to Learn: Kentucky's Experience,
FUTIJRE CHILDREN, Winter 1997, at 79, 89-94. They have identified five challenges to
the systemic reforms in that state:
(!) to create capacity at all levels of the educational system, (2) to implement
the various components of reform in a reasonable sequence, (3) to avoid recreating a stifling top-down bureaucracy, (4) to foster the public and
professional support needed to sustain change over time, and (5) to develop
mechanisms for continuous learning and adaptation.
Id. at 91.
380. See FuLCHER, supra note 2, at 104-05 (discussing Pennsylvania Ass'n for
Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972)).
381. Seeid.
382. See id.
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Education and Public Sector Finance Group."' Although the criteria
developed by this group were intended primarily to address special
education finance issues, 384 the authors outline the following principles,
which are broadly applicable to all policy concerns related to special
education:
•
•
•

•
•

•
•

Adequacy: Resource allocation and program development should
have the provision of a basic level of quality education to all
students as their main goal. 385
Outcome accountability: A statewide system for demonstrating
satisfactory progress of all students should be develoF,ed;
monitoring should be based on measures of student outcomes.' 6
Connection to general education: Policy should support a clear
conceptual link between special education and general education;
integration of funding will likely encourage integration of
,
387
services.
Equity: Resources should be distributed to ensure comparable
program quality throughout the state."'
Placement neutrality: A continuum of program options must be
available to students throughout the state; general policy and
funding mechanisms should not be based on the type of
"all
educatlon
p acement. 389
Fiscal accountability: Accounting procedures should ensure funds
are used appropriately while containing excessive or inappropriate
costs. 390
Cost-based: State support should reflect actual costs of providing
•
391
services.

383. See Parrish & Chambers, supra note 334, at 133-35. Parrish and Chambers are
the co-directors of the Education and Public Sector Finance Group, a private, non-profit
division of the American Institutes for Research, which is involved in research
addressing the national agenda for special education finance and the conduct of federal
and state studies of the impact of special education finance reform. See Center for Educ.
Fin., About CSEF (visited Oct. 18, 1999) <http://www.air.org/csef_hom/tom.html>.
384. See Parrish & Chambers, supra note 334, at 133-35.
385. See id. at 134.
386. See id. at 135.
387. See id.
388. See id. at 134.
389. See id. at 135.
390. See id. at 134.
391. See id.
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•
•
•
•

•
•
•

Cost control: Patterns of growth should be stabilized over time.392
Identification neutrality: Policy should not provide inappropriate
incentives to either label students for special education or to
arbitrarily contain special education populations."'
Understandability: The system and its underlying policy should be
easily understood by concerned parties; regulation should avoid
• 394
unnecessary comp1ex1ty.
Flexibility: Local agencies should be given a degree of flexibility
to deal with unique local conditions in an appropriate and costeffective manner; maximum latitude in resource use should be
permitted in exchange for outcome accountability."'
Reasonable reporting burden: Record keeping and its resultant
cost should be kept to a reasonable level. 396
Predictability: Policy should allow local education agencies time
to plan for the provision of services over both the short- and longterm."'
Political acceptability: Implementation of policy should avoid
disruption of existing services and major short-term losses in
funds."'

This Comment suggests that the State of California should employ the
criteria enumerated above, or a similar checklist, when developing
special education policy and law. Such a list would go far to avoid the
untoward effects of "knee-jerk" policy making and remaking that has
characterized contemporary education practices in California by forcing
policymakers to consider competing interests and objectives that affect
education in both the short- and long-term.
B.
I.

Specific Suggestions

Including Special Education Perspectives

Special education and general education have developed as parallel
systems, each with their own policies, management, and evaluation
systems. 399 Disabled students have generally not been considered during

392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
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See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 135.
id. at 134.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id. at 135.
Geenen et al., supra note 11, at 5.
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general education reform.4()() When students with disabilities are
excluded from consideration and participation in standards, curriculum,
and testing development, they are disempowered; they become invisible
to the system.'°' Exclusion during development stages often results in
exclusion from reform initiatives designed to improve outcomes, as well
as exclusion from accountability for outcome failures.'°' Adequate
education can only be provided if special education is considered an
integral part of state education at all stages of planning, development,
and implementation.403 Thus, the first step in ensuring adequacy for
special education students is to include these students and their needs in
all statewide and local decisions regarding education.
A few states have made progress toward including disabled students'
perspectives in education reforms. For example, special educators
participated in curriculum and standards development committees in
Kentucky, Vermont, and Nebraska.404 In New Jersey, special educators
are helping to develop assessments to make sure that disabled students'
needs are taken into account while tests are being created.405 General and
special education teachers in Colorado are looking together at ways to
assist students with di verse needs in meeting state standards.""
400. See id. at 5-7. For example, although 50% of states indicate that educational
standards are applicable to "all" students, only 8% of these define "all" as including
disabled students. See id at 7. Even when disabled students are included in state and
local testing, their scores are often discarded and they are, therefore, excluded from
accountability and reform efforts. See id.
401. See ELLIOTT & THURLOW, ASSESSMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 153,
at 11; Thurlow et al., supra note 310, at 3; see also ELLIOTT & THURLOW, STANDARDS,
supra note 309, at 9 (listing professional education standards setting groups and noting
that most have not been very concerned with including disabled students, which they
consider a '"special interest group,"' when developing test instruments). See generally
JAMES E. YSSELDYKE ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE RESULTS OF EDUCATING
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES: ASSESSMENT CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE NEW
ASSESSMENT PROVISIONS OF THE 1997 AMENDMENTS TO THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (Nat'! Ctr. on Educ. Outcomes, Univ. of Minn.,
Minneapolis, Minn., 1998), microformed on ERIC, Fiche ED 425 588 (ERIC Document
Reprod. Serv., Computer Microfilm Int'! Corp.).
402. See YSSELDYKE ET AL., supra note 401, at 2; Thurlow et al., supra note 310, at
1-3.
403. See EDUCATING ONE AND ALL: STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND STANDARDSBASED REFORM 192-93 (Lorraine M. McDonnell et al. eds., National Academy Press
1997) [hereinafter EDUCATING ONE AND ALL]; FRASER, supra note 310, at 27; Thurlow et
al., supra note 310, at 1-3. See generally YSSELDYKE ET AL,, supra note 401.
404. See FRASER, supra note 310, at 19.
405. See id. at 20.
406. See id. at 19.
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If California is to provide adequate education, it must follow these
states' lead in replacing the rhetoric of including all students in
educational policy with actual practice and commitment.

2.

Standards

Some stakeholders fear that adapting standards to meet the needs of
students with disabilities will "dumb down" or reduce the overall quality
of education.'°'
Furthermore, a paradox exists between the
individualization of special education and the generalization implied by
standards. 408
Several approaches to the problem of designing standards to include
special education students have been implemented by other states.'°'
Some states have expanded their standards to encompass the spectrum of
disabled students' potentials. 410 Alternative standards, including life
skills, have also been used. 411 Another approach is to provide a single set
of high standards, but describe various levels of proficiency.412 Thus, the
college-bound student might strive for the highest level of proficiency,
while the cognitively-impaired student may be directed to a lower level
of proficiency within the same range of content areas."'
407.

ELLIOTT& THURLOW, STANDARDS, supra note 309, at II; Geenen et al., supra

note 11, at 6.

408. See ELLIOTT & THURLOW, STANDARDS, supra note 309, at 13-16; YSSELDYKE
ET AL., supra note 401, at 6; see also EDUCATING ONE AND ALL, supra note 403, at 15152 (describing current approaches to standards-based education reform and the
complexities of including students with IEPs ).
409. See ELLIOTT & THURLOW, STANDARDS, supra note 309, at 13-16 (discussing
the merits of various approaches to standard setting that include disabled students).
410. See EDUCATING ONE AND ALL, supra note 403, at 137; ELLIOTT & THURLOW,
STANDARDS, supra note 309, at 14-16; FRASER, supra note 310, at 8.
411. See ELLIOTT & THURLOW, STANDARDS, supra note 309, at 14-16; Geenen et
al., supra note 11, at 4-5; James E. Ysseldyke & Ken Olsen, Putting Alternate
Assessments into Practice: What to Measure and Possible Sources of Data, SYNTHESIS
REP. 28 (Nat'] Ctr. on Educ. Outcomes, Univ. of Minn., Minneapolis, Minn.), Sept.
1997, microformed on ERIC, Fiche ED 416 605 (ERIC Document Reprod. Serv.,
Computer Microfilm Int'] Corp.).
412. ELLIOTT & THURLOW, STANDARDS, supra note 309, at 13-14; Geenen et al.,
supra note I I, at 7.
413. The use of individual student's IEP goals has been suggested both as standards
and as measures of achievement. See A.B. 602 REPORT, supra note 305, at 27; see also
ELLIOTT & THURLOW, STANDARDS, supra note 309, at 14-15 (arguing some of the merits
and limitations of IEP-based standards). However, this Comment strongly urges against
using IEP goals for either accountability or monitoring of curriculum and instruction
efficacy. Goals and standards must be independent and objective. In contrast, IEPs are
intended to be individualized, not standardized. Furthermore, the IEP team must be able
to design and implement a child's educational program free from the conflicts that may
arise from team members' accountability concerns. To suggest that instructional
personnel on an IBP team should design the standards against which their own
performance may be assessed is much like suggesting that law students should compose,
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Experts suggest that direction is needed to avoid the "dumbing down"
of standards to accommodate disabled students; it is essential to provide
handicapped students the opportunity to learn and achieve their
potential.414 They also suggest that insufficient data exist to accurately
predict the full potential of many disabled students."' Yet guidelines
and standards need not be static-they can and should reflect changing
knowledge about education. 416
Standards are only one part of a systematic, coordinated effort of
curriculum development, teacher training, and methodological
417
1
improvement.
Standards should set the stage for instruction.4 '
Standards should define what is to be taught and instruction should be
tailored to those standards.419 It is senseless to have standards without
giving students the tools to achieve them; students must be taught what
0
is considered to be important."
administer, and grade their own bar examinations.
414. See ELLIOTT & THURLOW, STANDARDS, supra note 309, at 11-12; Geenen et
al., supra note 11, at 4-7.
415. Among the factors that contribute to current limits on predicting outcomes and
potentials for students with disabilities are the lack of outcome and assessment data,
limited instructional opportunities, absence of rigorous accountability for educating
special needs students, and limitations on the ability of professionals to accurately
diagnose and categorize students with various disabilities. See, e.g., EDUCATING ONE
AND ALL, supra note 403, at 141-42; ELLIOTT & THURLOW, ASSESSMENT AND
AccOUNTABILITY, supra note 153, at 14-15. Unfortunately, labeling a student as
disabled can often create a self-fulfilling prophecy, with lifelong negative effects due to
lowered expectations. See EDUCATING ONE AND ALL, supra note 403, at 83; ELLIOTT &
THURLOW, STANDARDS, supra note 309, at 12-15.
416. Over the 30 year history of the highly regarded National Assessment of
Educational Progress, for example, significant change has occurred as a result of
changing sociopolitical demands and evolving educational requirements of the
workforce. See GRADING THE NATION'S REPORT CARD, supra note 354, at 9-16.
417. See Thurlow et al., supra note 310, at 22-23. The process of coordinating
standards, curriculum, instruction, and assessment so that they all work together toward
the same ends is known as "alignment." EDUCATING ONE AND ALL, supra note 403, at
249.
418. See Thurlow et al., supra note 310, at 22.
419. See id.; see also Karen Langenfeld et al., High Stakes Testing for Students:
Unanswered Questions and Implications for Students with Disabilities, SYNTHESIS REP.
26 (Nat'! Ctr. on Educ. Outcomes, Univ. of Minn., Minneapolis, Minn.), Jan. 1997, at
20, microformed on ERIC, Fiche ED 415 627 (ERIC Document Reprod. Serv.,
Computer Microfilm Int'! Corp.) ("If properly conceived and implemented,
measurement-driven instruction currently constitutes the most cost-effective way of
improving the quality of public education in the United States.") (quoting W. C.
Popham, The Merits of Measurement-Driven Instruction, 68 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 679,
679 (1987)).
420. See Thurlow et al., supra note 310, at 22 ("This is not teaching to the test, but
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3.

Research and Coordinated Development Strategies

Standards, curriculum, and measurements of achievement should be in
a constant state of communication. To this end, objective research on
instructional methods and education policy is a central component of
effective education reform. Although some researchers suggest that
education is not amenable to scientific methods because of the
complexities involved in applying theory to real-life situations,421 most
others disagree."' Indeed the need to account for variability forms the
basis for compelling arguments supporting the use of scientific
methods.423 Leading education activist Ed Martin suggests: "Where
we've gone wrong in special education is that we haven't followed how
kids have done. We have not interpreted 'appropriate' as empirically
derived by student outcomes. We have used argument instead of
data ...."' 24
"Without data," Martin asserts, "all we have are
•
,,425
assumpt10ns.
Kentucky has made enormous strides in the area of research and
educational policy development. The decision in Rose'" required that
aligning and integrating the content of the assessment within the daily routine of
instruction.").
421. See, e.g., Deborah J. Gallagher, The Scientific Knowledge Base of Special
Education: Do We Know What We Think We Know?, 64 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 493,
493-500 (1998). Gallagher asserts that special education research has failed to provide
law-like generalizations essential to explaining, predicting, and controlling the objects of
study. See id. at 495-99. The author contrasts such results from special education
research with principles of scientific knowledge, which she characterizes as cumulative,
progressive, and able to reach resolutions about problems. See id. Since special
education does not conform to the principles of scientific inquiry, the author concludes
that special education cannot be addressed scientifically and should, therefore, be
addressed within a different ideological frame of reference. See id. at 499-500.
422. See, e.g., Judith Stephenson & John Imrie, Why Do We Need Randomized
Controlled Trials to Assess Behavioural Interventions?, 316 BRIT. MED. J. 611, 611
(1998); Joan Beck, Education 'Reform': Schools Shouldn't Be Subjected to Unconfirmed
Theories, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 8, 1998, at SJ ("Standards for what passes as
acceptable research often are inadequate. Too often, fads based on little but theory or
political expediency are pushed on powerless teachers while proven techniques ... are
discounted and research about the neurological development of the brain is ignored.");
Robert Holland, Editorial, Would You Trust Your Life to Ed-Faddists?, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 30, 1998, at All, available in 1998 WL 2054819. According to
Brookings Institute fellow and education analyst Diane Ravitch, "education should be
more like medicine in relying on canons of scientific reliability to protect the innocent
from specious theories and unproven remedies." Id.
423. See Stephenson & Imrie, supra note 422, at 611. The authors consider
controlled experimentation as the only way to minimize bias, avoid false conclusions,
and account for the known and unknown factors that influence outcomes. See id.
424. Jean B. Crockett & James M. Kauffman, Taking Inclusion Back to Its Roots,
EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Oct. 1998, at 74, 76.
425. Id.
426. For a detailed discussion of Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989), see supra Part III.C.
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Kentucky re-work its entire system of education."' The Kentucky
Education Reform Act (KERA/" implemented a coordinated system of
research, teacher training, curriculum development, assessment, and
reporting. 429 Key components of KERA include the development of
content standards and the alignment of goals through implementation of
the Kentucky Instruction Results Information System (KIRIS). 430 KERA
also established the Kentucky Institute for Education Research Board to
coordinate the study of education reform and its implementation." 1
During the first six years of implementation, KERA resulted in
substantial improvements in academic achievement and increased
opportunities for inclusion of disabled students in academic programs
and assessments."'
Although the jury is still out on many aspects of education reform in
Kentucky, KERA provides a framework for the continual monitoring
and refinement of programs designed specifically to provide adequate
education. Thus, when certain aspects of the KIRIS testing system were
recently called into question, the whole process did not need to be
scrapped. 433 Because the overall progress of KERA has been carefully
427. See Chris Pipho, Re-Forming Education in Kentucky, 71 PHI DELTA KAPPAN
662, 662 ( 1990).
428. Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990, 1990 Ky. Acts § 476 (H.B. 940)
(codified at KY. REV. STAT. ANN§ 158 (Banks-Baldwin 1996)).
429. See generally JANE CLARK LINDLE ET AL., 1996 REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON
KERA (1997); Systemic Reform: The Kentucky Example, 3 ERIC REv. 5 (1994).
430. See LINDLE ET AL., supra note 429, at xv-xxxv. KIRIS is a system of reporting
student achievement and rewarding teachers and schools for student performance. See
id. at xviii, 3-50.
431. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 158.646 (Banks-Baldwin 1996). The mission of
the Board is to act as a stimulus and clearinghouse on KERA-related research. See id.
The Board is also charged with effecting research on the impact of KERA on students,
schools, and educators; assessing the validity of KIRIS assessments; and implementing a
comprehensive educational data information system. See id. The Institute on Education
Reform at the University of Kentucky is a central component of KERA-related research
activities, studying the impact of education reform, publishing research studies, and
informing and impacting educators. See Institute on Education Reform, About the
Institute and Its Future Goals (visited Mar. 30, 1999) <http://www.uky.edu/
Education/IER/instit.htm>.
432. See LINDLE ET AL., supra note 429, at 3-50. Kentucky was one of only three
states in the United States to make statistically significant gains from 1992 to 1998 on
the NAEP 4th grade reading test. See Jim Parks, Kentucky Reading Scores Move Up in
National Rankings, KENTUCKY DEP'T OF EDUC. NEWS RELEASE, Mar. 4, 1999. Kentucky
showed a six percent increase in the number of proficient fourth grade readers, while the
number reading below a basic level decreased by five percent. See id.
433. See Andrea Tortora, Education Reform Example for Others; Ky. Lauded for
Tackling Problems, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 10, 1999, at Cl.
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434

monitored, deficiencies were quickly recognized.
Coordinated
research efforts suggested progressive, rational steps that could then be
implemented to correct the problem."'
It is not necessary for California to reconstruct its entire education
system to reap similar benefits. State-sponsored institutions of higher
education, including the University of California and the California State
University systems, already conduct world-class research in education.
The California Department of Education is equipped to apply that
research to policy, instruction, and curriculum implementation, while the
students in California's public schools provide a Ii ving laboratory for
436
assessing the efficacy of promising methods and strategies.
The
central pieces that are missing, however, are the testing and reporting of
exceptional students' outcomes; the accumulation, coordination, and
analysis of resulting data; and its application back into subsequent policy
437
and instructional decision making.
Until California commits to a
process by which actual student outcomes drive future change, special
education will fall short of its promise.

434. See id. "Kentucky had its program monitored and it has turned up positive and
negative findings." Id. "Kentucky is ahead of the game ... because it is not afraid to fix
problems in its education reform system." Id.
435. See id. A new testing system was scheduled for implementation in the Spring
of I 999. See id.
436. This Comment does not suggest that California should indulge in the
wholesale administration of unsound or unproven educational methods in order to test
the theory that such methods might be effective. Rather, a cautious, incremental,
carefully controlled, and monitored approach should be taken. This is the only true path
to valid scientific progress. It is exemplified by current national regulation of new
pharmaceutical drugs for medical use. Under Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regulations, manufacturers must demonstrate both the safety and efficacy of potential
new drugs through a series of rigorous clinical trials with volunteer subjects before
unleashing their wares on the public at large. See, e.g., Nancy K. Plant, Adequate WellControlled Clinical Trials: Reopening the Black Box, I WIDENER L. SYMP. J., 267, 26973 & n.24 (1996) (providing a concise overview of the drug approval process). Each
successive "phase" of clinical trials in a new drug application study involves a larger and
more diverse population with expanded variables, such as dosage and frequency of
administration. See id. Only after careful scrutiny of extensive data supporting a
purported therapeutic use will a drug be approved for the general population. See id. In
limited circumstances, such as "a serious or immediately life-threatening disease
condition in patients for whom no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or therapy
is available," experimental use is available at earlier stages in the process to a wider
range of individuals. Id. at 279 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a) (1998)); see id. at 277284. This Comment asserts that the basic conceptual framework embodied by the FDA
could be applied to education and would ensure that California's investment in future
generations of children are guided by sound, perhaps even outstanding, practice.
437. See Ed Mendel, Lack of Data May Limit Schools Accountability Program, SAN
DIEGO UNI0N-TRIB., Mar. 29, 1999, at A3 (reporting that the lack of a sophisticated datacollection and information system in California limits attempts to understand what is
happening in the state's 8000 schools and may compromise education reform efforts).
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4.

Inclusion of Students with Disabilities in
Statewide Assessments

Studies indicate that, nationally, as few as fifty percent of students
with disabilities are included in statewide assessment."" A number of
factors are thought to contribute to this low overall participation rate."'
Most are amenable to state intervention in the form of policy and
guidance, regulation, and legislation. For example, lack or vagueness of
440
guidelines for including students can be overcome by providing
441
guidelines and staff development.
Fear that assessment will cause
undue stress to a disabled child could be overcome by designing new
tests or providing accommodations that limit stressful conditions, as well
as educating parents and teachers on the importance of assessments in
442
school accountability. The misconception on the part of educators and
administrators that they are not responsible for the meaningful education
of disabled children can only be overcome by clear state and local
443
directives to the contrary .
Particular insights may be gleaned from states that have the highest
participation rates in the nation, such as North Carolina, Maryland, and
Kentucky, which report that virtually all students participate in statewide
444
assessments.
Each has created policies aimed at removing
445
inappropriate incentives for the exclusion of disabled students. North
Carolina, for example, assigns a random score to any student excluded

438. See ELLIOTT & THURLOW, ASSESSMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 153,
at 10-15 (reporting estimates that as many as 85% of the nearly five million special
education students in the United States could take part in standardized, large scale
assessments with or without accommodations).
439. See id. at 12.
440. See id.; Thurlow et al., supra note 310, at 17.
441. See ELLIOTT & THURLOW, ASSESSMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 153,
at 14, 23-24.
442. See id. at 17-18; Thurlow et al., supra note 310, at 17, 23-24.
443. See ELLIOTT & THURLOW, ASSESSMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 153,
at II.
444. See id. at 21-22.
445. See id. at 22. Examples of inappropriate incentives for exclusion include
systems of personal high-stakes accountability for overall student performance in a
school or district without a requirement for assessing all students. See id. at 11-12. Such
a system encourages exclusion of lower performing students, including those with
disabilities. See id. In some cases, this can even lead to inappropriate referral for special
education in order avoid accountability. See id.; YSSELDYKE ET AL., supra note 401, at
10.
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from testing, while Maryland assigns a "zero" for reporting purposes. 446
Kentucky simply does not permit exemption from statewide
assessment."' Such measures provide every incentive to test all
students.
In addition, Kentucky has identified a desired target
percentage of students for inclusion in assessments."' Schools that fall
below the target percentage trigger an investigation into the reasons for
exclusion."'
Although the IDEA 97 and state policx require inclusion of students in
standardized testing whenever possible, '° California would undoubtedly
benefit from strategies designed to maximize participation.
Furthermore, a general policy of carefully considering the incentives and
unintended consequences of education agency actions should be
implemented.
5.

Improving Outcomes for Students with Disabilities:
Accountability

Accountability for educational outcomes is arguably the hottest topic
in education today. Much of the discussion has focused on holding
schools and teachers accountable for the outcomes of their students. The
California Legislature has been considering several measures along these
lines during the current legislative term."'
446. See ELLIOTT & THURLOW, ASSESSMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 153,
at 22.
447. See Geenen et al., supra note 11, at 7.
448. See id. at21-22.
449. See id. A state auditing process is activated when more than 2% of a school
population is not administered standard tests. See id. Kentucky's non-participation rate
is less than 0.5%. See id.
450. See Memorandum from Dr. Alice D. Parker to Special Education Local Plan
Area Directors et al., supra note 364. The State has issued guidelines that encourage
school districts to "maximize the participation of students with disabilities in
assessment[]." Id. Nevertheless, students can be exempted from participation by the IEP
team. See id. This practice can be seen as an escape valve for schools that do not want
to be accountable for students with disabilities.
451. See Terri Hardy, Rush for Reform; Davis' Ambitious Package of Education
Proposals Prompts Districts to Call for More Time to Adjust, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Feb.
21, 1999, at Vl. One bill enacted in 1999 requires students to pass an examination
before graduating high school. See Act of Mar. 29, 1999, ch. I, 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv.
28, 28-30 (West) (S.B. 2, O'Connell) (codified at scattered sections of CAL. EDUC. CODE
(West 2000)). Another bill imposes a system of rewards and sanctions, including
heightened monitoring for low-performing schools. See Public Schools Accountability
Act of 1999, ch. 3, 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. 44, 44-46 (West) (S.B. I, Alpert) (codified at
CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 52050-52058 (West 2000)). If improvement is not seen in two
years, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction will be required to take action in the
form of reassigning employees, renegotiating collective bargaining agreements,
assigning school management to an outside agency, reorganizing the school (including
allowing parental conversion to a charter school), or closing the school entirely. See id.
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Care must be taken, however, to avoid the unintended consequences
of such "high stakes" accountability."' Undue pressure on special
education teachers for the outcomes of their students has been cited as a
factor in their decisions to leave the profession."' In a state suffering
critical shortages of qualified special education personnel,454 teacher
retention must be a high priority."' Although accountability is
considered essential to adeiuate outcomes, steps should be taken to
mitigate its negative effects.4
Texas's accountability system dramatically demonstrates just how
powerful a balanced approach can be.457 In that state, a system of
rewards and punishments for student outcomes has been implemented;
in exchange, schools and teachers have been given great flexibility in
their programmatic choices for achieving state standards."' As a direct
result of this system, Texas's students rank near the top in academic
achievement despite low teacher salaries, high poverty rates, and per
pupil spending well below the national average."'
at 52-53.
452. ELLIOTT & THURLOW, ASSESSMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 153, at
11; Langenfeld et al., supra note 419, at 1. Tests or assessments "can be considered high
stakes if the results . . . have perceived or real consequences for students, staff, or
schools." Id. Consequences range from explicit rewards and sanctions to more subtle
pressures, such as possible embarrassment. See id. at 17-18.
453. See M. David Miller et al., Factors that Predict Teachers Staying in, Leaving,
or Transferring from the Special Education Classroom, 65 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 201,
204-05 (1999).
Other factors include high caseloads, insufficient resources,
unsupportive environments, and excessive paperwork mandated by federal and state
laws. See id.
454. See STATE IMPROVEMENT PLAN, supra note 305, at 8-14.
455. See Miller et al., supra note 453, at 201.
456. See id. at 216. Miller's study suggests a number of approaches to reduce
teacher stress, including professional development activities, improving leadership, and
inclusion of teachers in collaborative decision making. See id. at 214-15.
457. See Tyce Palmaffy, The Gold Star State, POLICY REv., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 30;
Ed Mendel, Education Reformers Study Texas, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 20, 1999,
at Al (citing sources that call Texas "the poster-child state for accountability reform").
Mendel notes the striking similarities between Texas in the early 1990s, at the start of its
education reforms, and California today, as it embarks on a major education overhaul
under Governor Gray Davis. See id.
458. See Palmaffy, supra note 457, at 30-35.
459. See id. at 30. White fourth-graders in Texas had the highest math scores in the
nation on a recent test; black and hispanic students had similarly high scores. See id.
These results are remarkable considering that Texas has the 4th highest national
percentage of children living in poverty and pays teachers the 35th (lowest) salary in the
country. See id. It should be noted, however, that some fear schools may be "hiding
poor students by placing them in special-education classes." Id. at 31. Texas is only
beginning to include special education students in statewide accountability. See
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Another unintended consequence of accountability is inappropriate
placement or dumping. Low performing students may be diverted to
more restrictive placements, specialized schools, or non-public
placements to avoid the threat that their test performance will negatively
impact school or teacher evaluations. 460 Students with discipline
problems may even be subject to false arrest in order that they will
become the problem of the juvenile justice system rather than the school
district. 461
Kentucky has obviated this problem by mandating that students'
assessment data are reported to their home schools, regardless of
462
placement. This policy encourages local schools to take responsibility
for all students, including those with special needs. When local schools
recognize that they will be held accountable for the outcomes of students
placed off-site, they seek such placements only when a better outcome is
the likely result. As a bonus, this policy encourages schools to create
Accountability: Revisions Needed to TAAS Edict from Education Agency, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Feb. 27, 1998, at 9A.
460. See, e.g., ELLIOTT & THURLOW, ASSESSMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra
note 153, at 12; Geenen et al., supra note 11, at 7. This effect has been observed in
Texas where some schools have exempted more than 20% of the student population from
testing by labeling them "special ed." Palmaffy, supra note 457, at 37. According to
disability rights attorney Diane J. Lipton, "the knee-jerk reaction is to move the kids out,
which is only moving a prohlem someplace else." Peter Appleborne, Push for School
Safety Led to New Rules on Discipline, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1997, at B8. One way to
mediate these effects is to require testing, reporting, and public disclosure, but also to
disaggregate data on students with disabilities. See Geenen et al., supra note 11, at 7;
Thurlow et al., supra note 310, at 13-16. Such practices also permit better comparisons
of disabled students' progress to be made between schools and districts. See id.
461. See Interview with Joan Derebery Landguth, L.C.S.W., in San Diego, Cal.
(Aug. 30, 1998); see also Joan Derebery Landguth, Complaint Against the San Diego
County Office of Education, the San Diego Unified School District, the San Diego
County Department of Mental Health, and the San Diego County Juvenile Probation
Department (filed jointly with the U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights,
and the California State Department of Education, Compliance Unit), July 19, 1998
(alJeging a systemic pattern of discrimination exemplified by seven specific case
histories, including failure to provide appropriate education and related services to San
Diego County children, and facilitating arrests of these children upon manifestation of
behavior problems associated with their unaddressed disabilities) (on file with author);
California Department of Education Compliance Report # I-0044-98/99, Jan. 14, 1999
(sustaining 11 of 12 allegations and finding agencies out of compliance with 20
provisions of state and federal law) (on file with author); Leslie Sowers, The Mental
Health of Children Part lll; Too !Ate for Help?, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 9, 1998, at l
[hereinafter Sowers, Too !Ate for Help?] (noting that it is easier to "take a child and lock
them [sic] up and throw away the key" than to deal with violent behavior); Leslie
Sowers, The Mental Health of Children; The Little Ones, HOUSTON CHRON., May 17,
1998, at 6 [hereinafter Sowers, The Little Ones] ("[Children] need intervention. Not at
the time they spray Jonesboro with gunfire, but way before that.") (quoting
Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee (D-Houston)).
462. See ELLIOTT & THURLOW, ASSESSMENT AND AccoUNTABILITY, supra note 153,
at 22.
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high-quality, inclusionary education in local schools while balancing
inappropriate, cost-based incentives to place students in public schools
that are unable to provide adequate education. Finally, it normalizes
data on outcomes within the state since individual school assessment
results are not skewed by artificially high or low percentages of students
at the low end of performance scales. 463
6.

Student Outcomes and Special Education Costs

The costs of special education have recently received widespread
media attention, along with calls for cost-containment and more rational
policies comparing the costs to the benefits. 464 Highly publicized
examples of pricey court-awarded private school placements have
fostered a;,mblic perception that too much money is spent on special
education. ' Although $100,000 placements are rare, they lead to the
conclusion that the education of special needs children encroaches on the
education of other children in the state. 466 The public may believe that
467
the social benefits of education are minimal in comparison to the costs.
Exorbitant costs are rightfully a concern of California residents, but
media reports minimize the role that state and local education agencies
play in controlling such costs. Under California Law, special education
students are only placed in private schools when an a,epropriate
education has not been made available in the public schools. As the
United States Supreme Court noted in Florence County School District
Four v. Carter: 469
[P]ublic educational authorities who want to avoid reimbursing parents for the
private education of a disabled child can do one of two things: give the child a
free appropriate public education in a public setting, or place the child in an
appropriate private setting of the State's choice. This is IDEA's mandate, and

463. See Thurlow et al., supra note 310, at I, 13-14.
464. See Zirkel, supra note 54, at 122.
465. See id.
466. See id. at 123 (citing news reports charging that special education awards
cause "hemorrhaging" of public money to pay for private tuition).
467. See generally Nevzer Stacey, Social Benefas of Education, 559 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 54 (1998) (suggesting that the wide range of benefits from
education are either underestimated or are not clearly understood).
468. See CAL. EDUC. CODE§ 56365 (West 1998).
469. 510 U.S. 7 (1993).
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school officials who conform to it need not worry about reimbursement
claims.410

These observations underscore the fact that education is an artificial
economic system in which the benefits of education, as well as the
consequences of its inadequacies, are not brought to bear on those within
the system.
Modem economic theory calls such benefits and
consequences "externalities," and would suggest a remedial apg,roach in
which the externalities are directly imposed upon the system. ' Under
such a theory, the cost of private school tuition may be conceived as an
externality that should rightfully be imposed on the school system.
However, this interpretation imposes the penalty on innocent victims
(schoolchildren) rather than on those who are responsible (school
officials).
Another problem with the economic analysis of education as a policy
device is that the direct costs of education are immediate and easily
quantifiable, while the benefits are long-term and can only be
estimated."' The prospective nature of educational benefits make them
difficult to sell to policymakers faced with today's bottom line.
A prime example of the external costs of inadequate education is the
resulting effect on the criminal justice system. Recent studies of
juvenile delinquents indicate that forty to eighty percent have undetected
and unaddressed learning disabilities.473 Within three to five years out of
470. Id. at 15.
471. See Robert C. Fellmeth, A Theory of Regulation: A Platform for State
Regulatory Reform, 5 CAL. REG. L. REP., Spring 1985, at 3, 8. See generally RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998).
472. See generally Richard Whisnant & Diane DeWitt Cherry, Economic Analysis
of Rules: Devolution, Evolution, and Realism, 31 WAKEFORESTL. REV. 693, 727 (1996)
(discussing the difficulties inherent in regulatory schemes based on cost versus benefit
analysis).
473. See Clyde A. Winters, Learning Disabilities, Crime, Delinquency, and Special
Education Placement, 32 ADOLESCENCE 451, 451-60 (1997) (summarizing recent
research on the link between learning disabilities and criminal activity of youth and
adults). According to Winter's research, special needs students in correctional facilities
have often not been diagnosed and served in the public schools. See id. at 460. He
asserts that it is "imperative" to identify "at risk" students and provide the special
education services that they need. Id. Juvenile court justice Francis T. Murphy suggests
that students who are not properly helped may '"explode' into aggressive or antisocial
behavior." Francis T. Murphy, Learning Disabilities and the Courts: Taking a Stand
Against Indifference, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1996, at SI (citing estimates that at least 40
percent of the population in juvenile detention facilities suffers from learning disabilities
and such youths are 220% more likely to be adjudicated delinquents than non-disabled
youths); see also NOEL DUNIVANT, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEARNING DISABILITIES
AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 9-18 (1982) (describing both cross sectional and
longitudinal studies demonstrating higher first time and re-arrest rates for learning
disabled youths); JOHN B. SIKORSKI & THOMAS P. McGEE, LEARNING DISABILITIES AND
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 13-14 (1986) (describing the results of the Link Study
commissioned by the National Institute of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
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high school, thirty-one percent of learning disabled youths will be
arrested.474 Other studies indicate a high proportion with emotional and
mental disturbances."' According to the California Department of
Corrections, the cost of housing such delinquents in California prisons
and juvenile facilities exceeds $20,000 per year."' B1 comparison,
special education is cheap at less than one third that cost."
Promising studies indicate a positive correlation between educational
interventions and reduced recidivism for juvenile offenders."' Even
which found that 36.5% of officially adjudicated boys were learning disabled as
compared to only 18.9% of nondeliquents); Paul K. Broder et al., Further Observations
on the link Between Leaming Disabilities and Juvenile Delinquency, 73 J. EDUC.
PSYCH. 838, 838-44 (1981) (finding that learning disabled boys were more likely to be
found delinquent by juvenile courts than their non-disabled counterparts); Blossom M.
Turk, Editorial, Identify, Serve Those with 'Hidden Handicap' to Reduce Prison Costs,
IDAHO STATESMAN, Dec. 9, 1997, at IOa (indicating that as many as 70% of juvenile
delinquents have undetected learning disabilities).
474. See Evidence of Failure for Persons with learning Disabilities, LOA
NEWSBRIEFS (Learning Disabilities Association, Pittsburgh, Pa.), Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 21,
21.
475. See Sowers, Too Late for Help?, supra note 461, at 1 (indicating that an
estimated 150,000 youths in the juvenile justice system have at least one diagnosable
mental disorder).
476. See IDEA Reauthorization 1997: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Early
Childhood, Youth and Families of the House Educ. and the Workforce Comm., 105th
Cong. (1997) (statement of Gregory W. Harding, Chief Deputy Dir., Support Servs., Cal.
Dep't of Corrections).
477. For example, the average cost of special education was about $6000 per pupil
in Orange County during 1997-1998. See Gittelsohn & Kelleher, supra note 63, at Al.
Advocates in Texas estimate that for every $5 spent on early intervention, the public
could save $41 later spent on criminal activity. See Sowers, The Little Ones, supra note
461, at 6. In contrast, incarceration is the most expensive and least effective way to fight
crime, costing ten or more times the cost of prevention. See Ulysses Currie, Editorial,
Better than locking Them Up, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1997, at CS.
478. See S1KORSK1 & McGEE, supra note 473, at 17-20 (showing a direct correlation
between reduction in delinquent activity and the number of hours of remedial instruction
youths received in an experimental study); Norman Brier, Targeted Treatment for
Adjudicated Youth with learning Disabilities: Effects on Recidivism, 27 J. LEARNING
DISABILITIES 215, 215-220 (1994) (reporting that only 12% of adjudicated youths who
participated in a targeted psychosocial, educational, and vocational treatment program
were re-arrested during a 20 month follow-up as compared to 40% of youths who did not
participate in the program); Elaine Traynelis-Yurek & George A. Giacobbe,
Unremediated learning Disabilities and Re incarceration, I 3 J. OFFENDER COUNSELING,
SERVICES & REHABILITATION 163, 163-70 (1988) (demonstrating the success of
remediating learning disabilities with special education by reducing the number of boys
who were reincarcerated by half); Currie, supra note 477, at C8; David Johnston,
Optometrist Argues Case for Vision Therapy, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1987, at R8 (describing
the results of one study indicating that re-arrest rates for juveniles who received vision
therapy were 80% lower than for comparable juveniles who did not); Turk, supra note
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more promising are studies suggesting that early interventions can
significantly reduce the number of first time offenders."'
If delinquency is the result of inadequate special education,
economists would suggest that measures be taken to force schools to
"internalize" the "external costs" they create. 480 Alternatively, schools
could be permitted to "internalize" the benefits to society for providing
adequate special education."' In such a system, excess costs avoided by
the juvenile justice system would be available to schools for special
education.
Although statutory prohibitions and regulatory bureaucracy may
prevent the direct transfer of funds from one agency to another,"' the
same effect could be achieved through cooperation and coordination of
services between agencies. A model for such a service delivery system
is the Heartbeat program in San Diego, California."' The Heartbeat
model provides emotionally disturbed students with the coordinated
services of various stakeholders including: the Departments of Social
Services, Health Services, Mental Health, Alcohol and Drug Services;

473, at 10a (noting regional studies showing that when learning disabled juvenile
offenders were offered remedial special education services, their recidivism rate dropped
to below two percent).
479. See Linda Dusenbury et al., Nine Critical Elements of Promising Violence
Prevention Programs, 67 J. SCHOOL HEALTH 409, 409-15 (1997); see also Scott Stephen,
Fonnightly Review: Aggressive Behavior in Childhood, 316 BRIT. MED. J. 202, 204-05
(I 998) (suggesting that the earlier intervention is initiated, the more positive the
outcomes are on violent behavior); Hirokazu Yoshikawa, Long-Tenn Effects of Early
Childhood Programs on Social Outcomes and Delinquency, FuTURE CHILDREN, Winter
1995, at 51, 59 (discussing the results of the High/Scope Perry project in which early
intervention services provided to children at ages three to four resulted in significantly
reduced or less severe criminal activity later in life). Current research in neuroscience,
on the plasticity of the human brain in youth and decreasing malleability with age, is
consistent with these results and further suggests that effective intervention should take
advantage of developmental windows of opportunity. See Child Mental Health Research
1997: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub/. Health & Safety, Senate Labor & Human
Resources Comm., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Steven E. Hyman, Director,
National Institutes of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health). Based on the child
development research, one educator has called early intervention "an educational
'vaccine."' Ellenmorris Tiegerman, Early Intervention ls Key in Special Ed., NEWSDAY,
Dec. 8, 1997, at A32.
480. See Fellmeth, supra note 471, at 8.
481. Id.
482. See Clark Brooks, Mental Help for Kids May Soon Be a Heanbeat Away, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 12, 1998, at Al (noting the problems with redistributing federal
and state money earmarked for specific services, as well as with confidentiality laws that
prohibit providers from sharing information about the children they serve).
483. See id.; Angela Lau, Psychiatric Care Is Hard to Find at Juvenile Hall, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 15, 1998, at Bl; Carmen Robles-Gordon, Project Heanbeat:
Planning for Managed Care for Children with Special Needs (visited Apr. l, 1999)
<http://www.chcs.org/CHCS/casey897 .htm>.
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the school districts; and the juvenile court."' According to Heartbeat
Director Sharon Kalemkiarian, "The idea is to let the dollars follow the
kids instead of the other way around."485 Rather than passing off
students (and the financial responsibility for their education and
treatment) to another agency, Heartbeat encourages shared responsibility
and early identification of at-risk youth. 486 Although programs such as
Heartbeat are in their infancy, they hold great promise for efficient
resource utilization, improved efficacy, and enhanced recognition of the
role of all stakeholders in accountability toward children.
7.

Compliance

Laws and regulations are only effective to the extent that they are
followed."' As detailed above, California has a significant problem with
special education compliance."' Among the barriers to compliance is
the lack of effective means for enforcing special education laws.489 For
this reason, future regulatory efforts should be tailored to maximize
incentives for compliance.490 Such self-implementing regulations would
obviate the need for enforcement.
Yet, to the extent that this type of regulation is not possible, penalties
484. See Robles-Gordon, supra note 483. Heartbeat was designed in response to
the need to stretch scarce service dollars and, at the same time, to make sure that
emotionally disturbed children do not slide into a life of crime. See Brooks, supra note
482, at Al; Editorial, Put Children First: Details Shouldn't Deny Help for Disturbed
Kids, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 22, 1998, at B6 [hereinafter Put Children First].
485. Put Children First, supra note 484, at B6 (noting that up until now, children
have had to fit the mold of government services).
486. See Brooks, supra note 482, at A I; Lau, supra note 483, at BI; RoblesGordon, supra note 483.
487. For an interesting analysis of societal compliance with legal rules, see
generally Emily Sherwin, Legal Rules and Social Reform, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 455
(1999).
488. See discussion supra Part IV.C.3.
489. See A.B. 602 REPORT, supra note 305, at 36-45. For example, the Assembly
Bill 602 Workgroup noted, among other things, the lack of specific authority in
California state law for COE to enforce special education compliance. See id. at 50.
490. The Assembly Bill 602 Workgroup recommends, for example, assessing the
investigation costs of sustained complaints against the offending school district as "an
incentive for compliance." Id. at 48. School districts could avoid such costs by
resolving complaints locally within 60 days, or by avoiding complaints altogether. See
id. The proposed scheme is flawed, however, because the sanction of withheld funds
will likely impact the adequacy of education provided to local schoolchildren. In order
for incentives to have the desired impact, they must target the financial, political, and/or
other concerns of individuals who are directly responsible for non-compliance, including
local educators, administrators, and school board members.
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should be imposed on responsible parties rather than innocent victims
(i.e., students). The IDEA provides for the withholding of funds from
local school districts for non-compliance."' However, this penalty is
rarely imposed because services must be provided to students despite the
492
failures of local school districts.
For an individual student, services
can be provided directly, or contracted by the State when the local
school district fails."' In the context of systemic non-compliance,
however, the State would be required to take over and run an entire
school district. 494 Thus, there are currently no practical and effective
penalties for school districts that habitually refuse to comply with
special education laws."'
A regulatory solution to this problem could include the imposition of
intermediate sanctions on responsible parties.•% Instead of relying on the
ultimate penalty of withholding funds, the Workgroup established by
California Assembly Bill 602 recommends a series of clearly defined,
tiered consequences for failure to implement federal and state Jaws. 497
The Workgroup's suggestions include improved measures for tracking
patterns of non-compliance, increased state oversight when districts are
found out of compliance, awards of compensatory education to students
deprived of free appropriate public education, withholding of the local
superintendent's salary for repeated violations, and in cases of persistent
non-compliance, appointment of an individual authorized by the State to
bring the school district into compliance."' California would go a long
way toward ensuring that its laws and policies are implemented by
adopting the recommendations of its own legislative workgroup.
VII. CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of education is to prepare schoolchildren for the futureto provide the skills and knowledge necessary for life, work, and
participation in society. Parents should be able to trust that the system
491. See 20 U.S.C. 1413(d)(l) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
492. See A.B. 602 REPORT, supra note 30S, at S4 (noting that when the State of
California has attempted to sanction local school districts by withholding funds in the
past, it has resulted in delays in delivering services to students and imposed an
unsustainable administrative burden on California Department of Education staff).
493. See id. at 50, 54 (suggesting, however, that the state providing direct services
to local schoolchildren is both impractical and of questionable public policy) .
494. Systemic non-compliance refers to the failure of a local education agency to
provide entire groups of students one or more of the essential elements of special
education specified in federal or state law. See id. at 59.
49S. See id. at 44.
496. See, e.g., A.B. 602 REPORT, supra note 305, at 49-50.
497. See id.
498. See id. at 40-47, 54-62.
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of education in California serves that purpose for each and every child.
When they drop off their children each day at the schoolhouse door,
parents should not need to question whether the professionals within are
following the best practices, utilizing appropriate strategies, or receiving
sufficient support to enable learning. Yet far too often, even the
extensive procedural safeguards that are in place under the IDEA fail to
ensure that special education students are learning. Parents become
impatient with a system that seems to have buried the vision they hold
for their children's future under layers of statute and administrative
bureaucracy. As it has in the past, impatience may lead parents to call
for a more decisive, if not swifter, form of justice from the courts.
It is time for California to do the right thing. Whether held by a court,
or simply implied from observation, disabled students in California are
not receiving adequate education. The State Legislature and education
agencies should take a proactive approach to remedy this situation and
thereby avoid unnecessary litigation. The discussion above provides a
framework for addressing key components of adequate education:
standards, resources, and outcomes. This Comment suggests that
creative solutions should be devised to adequately educate disabled
students. Such solutions should consider special education students'
needs during every stage of the development and implementation of
coordinated and well-planned reform efforts. They may draw upon
innovative strategies that have been implemented in other contexts or
devise new ones, but should carefully consider the incentives, benefits,
and consequences created by their actions.
JANEK. BABIN
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